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In this thesis we propose a skeptical scenario about a priori knowledge. The scenario is 
composed of three main arguments: the a priori brain-in-a-vat argument, the problem of 
deduction, and the rule–following paradox. We propose a solution for a priori skepticism 
that is based on two philosophical schools: conventionalism and contextualism. Finally, we 
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1 Introduction
The idea that humans can acquire and possess knowledge inde-
pendently of experience was rooted in philosophical thought since
the times of the Ancient Greeks. In fact, two major philosophical
schools emerged, in which the relationship between knowledge and
experience was problematized and became the subject of conicting
epistemological outlooks. The rationalist school claimed that a por-
tion of human knowledge can only be justied independently from
experience (viz. a priori knowledge), while the empiricist school
generally denied this possibility, and claimed that all knowledge can
only originate in and be justied with reference to sensuous experi-
ence (viz. a posteriori knowledge). A third approach to knowledge
is skepticism which comes in many forms1. One form is the epis-
temological form (i.e. focuses on the epistemic status of a certain
proposition). Another is the ontological form (i.e. focuses on the
state of existence of a specic entity like the `universal'). Also, skep-
ticism can vary in degree; it can be local or radical. Local skepticism
is concerned with limited beliefs about specic subjects, like beliefs
about mathematical objects. On the other hand, radical skepticism
challenges all beliefs formed about all subject matters. Historically,
radical epistemological skepticism can be traced back to two sources:
Pyrrhonian skepticism and Cartesian skepticism. The former type
counterargues any belief through some skeptical strategies that are
at least as compelling as the original argument(s) oered. The latter
type mainly uses the skeptical hypotheses strategy to undermine the
supposed knowledge claims. In the Cartesian method, the skeptic
will start by suggesting that the claimed knowledge might possi-
bly be wrong, and that the skeptical hypothesis might possibly be
true. But since we don't know whether the skeptical hypothesis is
right or wrong, it follows that we also lack knowledge of the origi-
nal proposition in question. A variety of skeptical hypotheses have
been proposed. In Descartes's Meditations on First Philosophy, the
rst Meditation oered three skeptical arguments: (i) the sense illu-
sion argument, (ii) the dream argument, and (iii) the `Evil Genius'
argument. The Evil Genius argument  which is the most radical
one  might be sketched as follows: imagine that you live in a world
where an Evil Genius is deceiving you about all subject matters. Ac-
1Our discussion of skepticism relies on Pritchard (2016).
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cordingly, all your beliefs about the world are systematically false2.
With the rise of philosophical materialism in the 20th century, some
philosophers claimed that the Cartesian Evil Genius hypothesis is
logically impossible as it is not possible for a matterless mind to ex-
ist3. Therefore, Hilary Putnam (1981) proposed a new version of the
Cartesian skeptical hypothesis that is consistent with materialism:
the brain-in-a-vat hypothesis4. Imagine that you are a disembodied
brain oating in a vat, and connected to a massive computer that
can produce a simulation indiscernible from external reality. Now,
your experience of the external world will be identical with the ex-
perience of an ordinary person who is not a brain-in-a-vat (BIV5).
Thus, the skeptical hypothesis claims our inability to show that our
basic beliefs about the external world are de facto true. Denote any
external world propositional claim by P , and denote the skeptical
hypothesis by Sh; then the skeptical argument will take the following
form6:
 a1. I am unable to know the denials of Sh.
 a2. If I am unable to know the denials of Sh, then I do not
know that P is true.
 c. Thus, I do not know that P is true.
Sh is any hypothesis that is irreconcilable with commonly claimed
propositional knowledge. The strength of Sh is that it imposes a sce-
nario that is subjectively indistinguishable from `normal' situations.
The skeptical premise in (a) claims that it is not possible to refute
Sh, and that it holds, at least in terms of logical possibility. But if
(a) is correct, then any proposition P the truth of which depends on
the falsehood of Sh is threatened too. Hence, the skeptic concludes
in (c) that P is unknowable.
Most commonly, skeptical arguments have been applied to a pos-
teriori propositions (e.g. the existence of the external world) since
2See Greco (2007) for an exposition of external world skepticism.
3See Brueckner (2016).
4Putnam's original formulation used the plural term brains-in-a-vat, however most of the
recent literature on external world skepticism refers to the singular brain-in-a-vat (maybe
to stick to the Cartesian formulation).
5Putnam essentially used semantic externalism to argue against the brain-in-a-vat scenario.
6This formulation is due to Pritchard (2016)
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they are falsiable by nature, at least in principle. In this essay, how-
ever, we are interested in another underexplored type of skepticism,
namely skepticism concerning the truth of a priori propositions. We
call this latter type of skepticism a priori skepticism . Our inter-
est in a priori skepticism stems from three dierent problems that
are already available in philosophical literature. These problems, if
combined, provide well-founded grounds for being skeptic about a
priori knowledge. Generally speaking, we distinguish between two
types of a priori skepticism: (i) the a priori brain-in-a-vat argument,
and (ii) the problem of formal language skepticism.
The a priori brain-in-a-vat argument is obtained by twisting the
external world brain-in-a-vat argument to target a priori instead of
a posteriori knowledge7. On the other hand, the problem of formal
language skepticism targets a specic type of a priori knowledge,
namely our formal logical-mathematical knowledge. The problem
of formal language skepticism is twofold: (a) the problem of deduc-
tion, and (b) the rule-following paradox. The former can be found
in Susan Haack's (1976) critique of the justication of deductive sys-
tems. What she aims at is constructing an analogous formulation
of the problem of induction for deductive inferential systems. But if
we are entitled to doubt the validity of deductive arguments, then
we are certainly also entitled to be skeptic about a priori knowl-
edge. Dierently, the rule-following paradox originated from Saul
Kripke's (1982) interpretation of Wittgenstein's Philosophical In-
vestigations . Kripke's rule-following paradox can be summarized as
follows: any rule can be restated in a way that makes any action
conform to it. If Kripke is correct then (almost) anything can be
inferred from any rule  including logical and mathematical rules 
which feeds our skepticism about a priori knowledge. Another vital
aspect in the discussion of a priori skepticism revolves around who
has the burden of proof? Michael Rescorla (2009) describes two
general philosophical positions regarding this question. Dialectical
foundationalism asserts that our reasoning is contingent on certain
privileged propositions, and therefore we are not supposed to de-
fend them just because they are challenged by an interlocutor. On
the contrary, Dialectical egalitarianism argues against the claimed
special status of these propositions, and that all propositions can be
7A priori skepticism can be found in Beebe (2011) and Willenken (2015).
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philosophically challenged. In this essay, we are going to escape this
debate by endorsing Dialectical egalitarianism.
At face value, it seems very dicult to be skeptic about a priori
knowledge, as we have the intuition that this represents a kind of
knowledge of something that holds necessarily, i.e cannot be other-
wise. Upon further reection, Kripke argued that this need not be
the case8. Thus by releasing a priority from its supposedly essen-
tial relation to necessity, the task of doubting the a priori becomes
easier. But, then, what is the source of the apparent necessity of
a priori knowledge? We will argue for two main sources: conven-
tionalism and contextualism. The rest of our thesis will mainly de-
fend a contextualistic and a conventionalistic view of a priori knowl-
edge, a view we label contextual-conventionalism . With the help of
contextual-conventionalism, we will be able to track the origin of
a priori skepticism to one fundamental source, namely the lack of
external conventions. We conclude that if we want to refute a priori
skepticism, we rst need to resolve the problem of the absence of
external conventions.
Our thesis is organized as follows: in sections 2-4 we will lay
down the  aforementioned  three philosophical problems (viz. the
a priori brain-in-a-vat argument, the problem of deduction, and the
rule-following paradox). In section 5, we will explore the relation be-
tween a priority and modality. Necessity will be studied by relying
on Kripke's notion of rigid designators . At the end of this investi-
gation, it is found that rigid designators are problematic unless tied
to specic contexts. By associating rigidity with specic contexts,
we will end up with a restricted notion of rigidity, namely contextual
rigidity . In section 6, we will move to the rst pillar of our thesis
by elaborating on the conventionalist tradition in philosophy from
Henri Poincaré to David Lewis. We mainly defend a specic version
of conventionalism that combines the views of Rudolf Carnap and
David Lewis against the attacks of W.V. Quine. Then, in section
7, we will present the second pillar of our thesis, namely contextu-
alism. In the last section, we will present two possible solutions for
a priori skepticism. The rst solution will be based on a reading
8Kripke's ideas will be discussed in detail in section 5.
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of Wittgenstein's hinge propositions which has been used by some
philosophers to counter external world skepticism9. Next, we show
that hinge propositions might work as an anti-skeptical strategy
for the a priori brain-in-a-vat hypothesis, but not for the problem
of formal language skepticism. Instead, we propose a new method
which combines both conventionalism and contextualism, namely
contextual-conventionalism 10 to deal with the a priori brain-in-a-vat
hypothesis and the problem of formal language skepticism. Finally,
we provide a sucient condition  call it absence of external conven-
tions  under which contextual-conventionalism can be the remedy
for a priori skepticism.
2 Formal Language Skepticism I: The Circularity Prob-
lem
2.1 Alston's Notion of Epistemic Circularity
Circular justication has always been problematic for many philoso-
phers across history11. Despite being defended by a contemporary
group of epistemologists including Laurence BonJour (1985) and
Keith Lehrer (1974, 1990), there is still a wide resistance to this
philosophical position12. In this section we are interested in a special
type of circular justication, namely epistemic circularity . Gener-
ally speaking, an argument is epistemically circular if it argues for
the reliability of a belief source by using premises or methods that
rely on the same belief source in question. We owe the contempo-
rary notion of epistemic circularity to William Alston (1986, 1989)
who basically claims that there is no plausible way of having a jus-
tied belief about our basic sources of knowledge (e.g. perception,
intuitive reasoning, introspection, memory, etc.) without using an
epistemically circular method. The problem of such conclusion is
that it allows for an `anything-goes' argument since we can infer
any proposition P by relying on a belief source that uses P itself.
9C.f. Crispin Wright (1985) and Peter Strawson (1985).
10There is another vein of semantic responses to skepticism due to Donald Davidson. See
for instance Davidson (1986), and Brueckner (1992).
11For a general overview, see Eemeren et al (1996).
12See Murphy (2016)
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Alston (1986) starts his investigation by posing a question (origi-
nally asked by Thomas Reid (1863)):
For Thomas Reid the most basic epistemological issue was
whether we are proceeding rationally in trusting, as we do,
our basic sources of belief perception, introspection, mem-
ory, testimony, and reasoning. Less metaphorical terms
than `source of belief' would be dispositions, tendencies,
or habit to form beliefs of certain kinds in certain circum-
stances. (1)
Alston is mainly interested in asking Reid's question regarding per-
ceptual beliefs . In other words, Alston asks whether we are rationally
justied in relying on perceptual experiences of the immediate phys-
ical environment to form perceptual beliefs. He uses what he calls
an inductive Track Record Argument (TRA) to check the validity
of this question. This TRA goes as follows:
1. Perceptual experiences indicate 1, . . . , n.
2. 1, . . . , n are true.
3. Perceptual experiences indicate 1, . . . , n, and 1, . . . , n
are true.
4. Hence, perceptual experiences generate accurate truth regard-
ing 1, . . . , n.
5. Therefore, perceptual beliefs formed by perceptual experiences
are reliable.
The problem of the TRA appears when moving from (1) to (2).
To justify that `1, . . . , n is true,' the TRA implicitly assumes
that perceptual experience is reliable based on previous observations
which is supposed to be the conclusion. This is what Alston labels
epistemic circularity . In his words: this kind of circularity involves
a commitment to the conclusion as a presupposition of our supposing
ourselves to be justied in holding the premises.13




Denition 1. (Epistemic Circularity) An argument A for the relia-
bility of a belief source is epistemically circular for a thinker S just
in case (i) A's conclusion that X is a reliable belief source, (ii) S's
belief in at least one of A's premises is a result of S employing X,
and (iii) S's belief in these premises would not have been justied
had S not employed X14.
In addition to epistemic circularity, Alston (1989, 1993) is com-
mitted to a generic form of reliabilism which states:
Denition 2. (Alston's Reliabilism): subject S is justied to believe
P if and only if P has a suciently reliable causal source.
Hence if sense perception, along with induction, is reliable, then
we are justied in accepting the premises of the TRA, and hence
the conclusion is obtained by an inductive procedure. Nevertheless,
Alston still acknowledges a problem in justifying the premises of the
TRA. He writes:
Epistemic circularity does not in and of itself disqualify
the argument. But even granting this point, the argument
will not do its job unless we are justied in accepting its
premises; and that is the case only if sense perception is
in fact reliable. This is to oer a stone instead of bread.
We can say the same of any belief-forming practice what-
ever, no matter how disreputable. We can just as well
say of crystal ball gazing that if it is reliable, we can use
a track-record argument to show that it is reliable. But
when we ask whether one or another source of belief is reli-
able, we are interested in discriminating those that can be
reasonably trusted from those that cannot. Hence merely
showing that if a given source is reliable it can be shown
by its record to be reliable, does nothing to indicate that
the source belongs to the sheep rather than with the goats.
(1993, 17)
In the rst line of the quotation given above, Alston writes that
epistemic circularity does not in and of itself disqualify the argu-
ment. What he probably means is that if we can grant that reli-
abilism, sense perception and induction hold, then we are justied
144.
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to accept the conclusion of the TRA. This epistemic demonstration
is problematic since it does not discriminate between reasonably
trusted sources and other non-reasonably trusted sources (e.g. be-
tween sense perceptions and crystal ball-gazing). Lynch and Silva
(2016) illustrate why epistemic demonstration is not enough  since
it clashes with other epistemic principles  by the following ctional
scenario:
Susan and Sally form beliefs about their immediate phys-
ical environment in surprisingly dierent ways. Susan
forms perceptual beliefs like we do: she takes her percep-
tual experiences as of P and proceeds to believe P (pro-
vided she has no relevant undefeated defeaters). Sally,
by contrast, forms perceptual beliefs quite dierently: she
takes her perceptual experiences as of P and (provided
she has no relevant undefeated defeaters) she proceeds to
believe (not-P&MP ) where MP is the proposition that
I'm in the Matrix and I'm having an experience as of
P . However, she always acts as if P , and thus is able to
live quite successfully despite her many false perceptual
beliefs. One day Susan and Sally encounter each other,
and, looking out upon a beautiful lake, Susan comments,
`That's a beautiful lake,' Sally replies, `There is no lake.
But our misleading experience as of a lake is beautiful.'
Susan and Sally continue to share their beliefs about their
immediate environment, and both come to realize that
they have extensively inconsistent views and that this dif-
ference is owed to their very dierent ways of responding
to their perceptual experiences. It is immediately obvious
to Susan and Sally that their ways of arriving at percep-
tual beliefs cannot both be reliable, i.e., at least one of
their ways of arriving at perceptual beliefs is unreliable.
(12-13)
The moral of the ctional story is to show how epistemic disagree-
ment can be dependent on the fundamental methods employed by
dierent people to form their beliefs. Lynch and Silva (2015) label
this disagreement as deep epistemic disagreement and the situation
as deep epistemic disagreement situation . More precisely, they de-
ne the former as follows:
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Denition 3. S1 is in a deep epistemic disagreement with S2 just
in case: (i) S1 employs an epistemic principle, EP , to arrive at
true beliefs in some domain of inquiry, (ii) S2 rejects that epistemic
principle as a reliable guide to forming true beliefs in that domain,
and (iii) S1 has no further epistemic principle, EP
, that does not
rely on or presuppose the reliability of EP with which he can show
that EP is in fact a reliable mean of arriving at true beliefs15.
The problem of the deep epistemic disagreement is that it is asym-
metric in the sense that subjects disagree on the reliability of their
epistemic principles. Moreover, there is no plausible way, from the
subjects' view-point, to weigh a specic epistemic principle over an-
other.
So far, we have been discussing the problem of epistemic circu-
larity with reference to perceptual beliefs, however, in this thesis we
are interested in exploring whether a similar problem can arise re-
garding a priori knowledge and a priori justication . Therefore, in
the next section we are going examine a dierent form of epistemic
circularity that is related to the deductive process of justication.
2.2 The Problem of Deduction
The problem of induction has been much debated in modern philos-
ophy since David Hume's Treatise of Human Nature ; however, its
analogous counterpart  the problem of deduction  did not attract
much attention until Lewis Carroll wrote a famous paper in 1895
describing the problem. In this paper, Carroll narrated a discussion
in which Achilles is trying to convince the tortoise to accept the
Euclidean argument:
 P1: Things that are equal to the same are equal to each other.
 P2: The two sides of this Triangle are things that are equal to
the same.
 C: The two sides of this Triangle are equal to each other.
Surprisingly, the tortoise wonders: what if a person accepts P1 and
P2, but rejects C ? Achilles responds that if one accepts P1 and
P2, then he must accept C. The tortoise suggests adding Achilles'
note  that if one accepts P1 and P2, then he must accept C  as an
1513.
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extra premise to the argument, and calls it P3. Despite that, and
unexpectedly, the tortoise asks about the possibility of accepting
P1, P2 and P3, but still denying C. Achilles tries to strengthen
the Euclidean argument by adding an extra premise P4 expressing
that `if P1, P2, and P3 are true, then C must be true.' After some
time, Achilles realizes that this process can continue ad innitum
without forcing the tortoise to accept the conclusion C. The tortoise
summarizes its general position by arguing that Whatever Logic is
good enough to tell me is worth writing down16. In that way, the
exact method of reasoning should always be stated explicitly in the
form of extra premises which implies that a conclusion can never be
forced. Haack (1976) notices that Achilles' failure in convincing the
tortoise is analogous to the failure of adding the extra premise of the
uniformity of nature to justify induction. One way to solve this, for
Haack, is to propose a set of rules that can justify the conclusion C
from premises P1and P2 in the aforementioned argument. Therefore,
she suggests dening an argument by the following:
Denition 4. For n  1, an argument is a sequence P1; P2; :::; Pn; C of
sentences where P1; P2; :::; Pn are premises and C is the conclusion.
Then, she proposes a syntactic denition for a valid deductive ar-
gument,
Denition 5. An argument P1; P2; :::; Pn ` C is deductively valid in a
system S if the conclusion C follows from the premises P1; P2; :::; Pn,
and the axioms of S, by virtue of the rules of inference of S.
Hence, we can justify a modus ponens argument, for instance, be-
cause of a set of predetermined rules of inference in S. Clearly, these
rules of inference must be deductively valid too; otherwise, we can-
not rely on them. The dilemma, again, is that we fall in circularity
because we are justifying deduction using a deductive method. So
Haack proposes another semantic denition for a deductively valid
argument:
Denition 6. An argument P1; P2; :::; Pn j= C is deductively valid if
it impossible for the premises P1; P2; :::; Pn to be true and for the
conclusion C to be false.
The semantic denition proposes that the premises entail the con-
clusion. If this is the case, then any deductive argument need not
16280.
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be justied as it will be true by virtue of meaning, i.e. the mean-
ing of the set of premises fP1; P2; :::; Png, and the meaning of the
conclusion C. In addition, the semantic denition cannot rely on
the schema (form) of the argument, rather it has to rely on some
instances of the argument. Due to the ambiguity of the notion of
meaning and the non-schematic form of the semantic denition,
Hack argues against it:
The claim that one can just see that the premisses justify
the conclusion is implausible in the extreme in view of the
fact that people can and do disagree about which argu-
ments are valid. Second, there is an implicit generality
in the claim that a particular argument is valid. For to
say that an argument is valid is not just to say that its
premisses and its conclusion are true  for that is neither
necessary nor sucient for (semantic) validity. Rather, it
is to say that its premisses could not be true without its
conclusion being true also, i.e. that there is no argument of
that form with true premisses and false conclusion . But
if the claim that a particular argument is valid is to be
spelled out by appeal to other arguments of that form,
it is hopeless to try to justify that form of argument by
appeal to the validity of its instance. (118)
Hence, from Haack's perspective, there is no clear way of assigning
the semantics of fP1; P2; :::; Png, j=, and C in a way that guarantees
that it is impossible for P1; P2; :::; Pn to be true and for C to be
false17.
To wrap up, Carroll's method in forcing a deductive conclusion
suers from premise-circularity , while Haack shows that a deduc-
tive justication of deduction suers from rule-circularity 18. These
results can be considered as an extension of the notion of epistemic
17In section 6, we will argue for a conventional defense of the semantic denition of deductive
validity.
18Rule-circularity is not necessarily a problem if one is willing to accept that deduction is
not epistemologically rmer than induction. Hack writes:
Those of us who are sceptical about the analytic/synthetic distinction will, no
doubt, nd these consequences [the problem of deduction] less unpalatable than
will those who accept it. And those of us who take a tolerant attitude to non-
standard logics  who regard logic as a theory, revisable, like other theories, in
the light of experience  may even nd these consequences welcome. (118)
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circularity to incorporate a priori justication19.
3 Formal Language Skepticism II: The Rule-Following
Paradox
3.1 Wittgenstein: On Rules of Language
In 185 of Philosophical Investigations (PI), Wittgenstein refers to
a story introduced earlier in 143 that investigates the notion of
rule-following and its relation to meaning-constitution. A student
was instructed by his master to write down a series of the form:
f0; n; 2n; 3n; :::g at the order of (+n). Hence, if the student fol-
lows the order of (+2), he will get the following series f0; 2; 4; 6; :::g.
Suppose the student wrote down that series up to 1000, then he
was asked to continue the series  beyond 1000  following the same
(+2) rule. Strangely, the pupil started continuing the series with
f1000; 1004; 1008; 1012; :::g. When the master warned the student
that he is continuing the series with wrong numbers, the student
replied that he is following the same rule since the beginning of the
series-counting process, and hence he cannot be mistaken. Wittgen-
stein writes:
Now we get the pupil to continue a series (say +2) beyond
1000  and he writes 1000, 1004, 1008, 1012. We say to
him: `Look what you've done!'  He doesn't understand.
We say: `You were meant to add two look how you began
the series!'  He answers: `Yes, isn't it right? I thought
that was how I was meant to do it.'  Or suppose
he pointed to the series and said: `But I went on in the
same way.'  It would now be no use to say: `But can't
you see . . . . ?'  and repeat the old examples and
19One proposed solution to the problem of deduction is to distinguish between rules of
inference and logical implications. A rule of inference like modus ponens allows us to infer q
from (p and (if p then q)), however this rule  in itself  is not a truth-bearer. Dierently, a
logical implication like if `p' and `if p then q' implies `q'  is a statement in the metalanguage
specifying a necessary logical relation between the premises and the conclusion of the object
language (i.e. the rule of inference). Thus, the premise-circularity problem is the mere result
of treating logical implications as rules of inferences. We think this solution is vulnerable to
Haack's criticisms as there is still no defense of the validity of the metalanguage. There are
also other resolutions like the one proposed by Gilbert Ryle (1945, 6) who suggested that
Carroll's regress problem is the result of confusing `knowing-how' with `knowing-that'. Ryle
basically argues that knowing the rules of inference (viz. `knowing-that') is not a sucient
condition for being able to implement these rules in practice (viz. `knowing-how').
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explanations. In such a case we might say, perhaps: It
comes natural to this person to understand our order with
our explanations as we should understand the order: `Add
2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to 3000 and so on.' (185,
PI )
Wittgenstein thinks that the student's behavior might be considered
as a special interpretation of the rule (+2) according to which the
student understands to add 2 up to 1000, add 4 up to 2000, add 6
up to 3000, etc. Therefore, the student was conforming to the rule
when he produced 1004 as the number following 1000 in the series.
This story is brought up to point out that following a rule is not
sucient for understanding the meaning of that rule. Wittgenstein
writes:
How is it decided what is the right step to take at any
particular stage?  `The right step is the one that accords
with the order  as it was meant '  So when you gave the
order +2 you meant that he was to write 1002 after 1000
 and did you also mean that he should write 1868 after
1866, and 100036 after 100034, and so on  an innite
number of such propositions?  `No: what I meant was,
that he should write the next but one number after every
number that he wrote; and from this all those propositions
follow in turn.'  But that is just what is in question:
what, at any stage, does follow from that sentence. Or,
again, what, at any stage we are to call `being in accord'
with that sentence (and with the meaning you then put
into the sentence  whatever that may have consisted
in). It would almost be more correct to say, not that
an intuition was needed at every stage, but that a new
decision was needed at every stage. (186, PI )
The crux of the problem can be summarized in the following ques-
tions: what determines the meaning of a rule? And who decides
which meaning to ascribe to a rule? Since there are innite situa-
tions to which we can apply  almost  any rule, and humans have
a nite capacity, then it might be dicult to determine what a rule
means at each single new situation. That is why Wittgenstein con-
siders that attaching a meaning to a rule is not a matter of intuition,
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but a matter of decision that is needed to be made in every new sit-
uation. Hence, the generation of the number 1002 after 1000 is in
accordance with (+2), but other numbers are possible as well. Saul
Kripke, among others, has interpreted Wittgenstein as presenting
a skeptical paradox regarding the meanings of rules of languages,
which we are going to discuss next.
3.2 Kripke's Skeptical Paradox
In this section we introduce Saul Kripke's main thoughts about the
previously discussed ideas of Wittgenstein on rule-following. Kripke
presents his ideas in his inuential book Wittgenstein on Rules and
Private Languages (WRPL) which was an exposition on some of the
Wittgensteinian ideas in Philosophical Investigations . It is worth
noting that there is a wide disagreement in the literature concerning
the question whether Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein's passages on
rule-following as developing and aiming at a skeptical paradox really
corresponds to Wittgenstein's intentions. That is why the literature
refers to WRPL as Kripkenstein . In this thesis, we are interested
in the rule-following paradox on its own as presented in WRPL 
as an original problem in the philosophy of language  regardless of
Wittgenstein's original intentions. Kripke writes:
In the following, I am largely trying to present Wittgen-
stein's argument, or, more accurately, that set of problems
and arguments which I personally have gotten out of read-
ing Wittgenstein. With few exceptions, I am not trying to
present views of my own; neither am I trying to endorse or
to criticize Wittgenstein's approach . . . Probably many of
my formulations and recastings of the argument are done
in a way Wittgenstein would not himself approve. So the
present paper should be thought of as expounding neither
`Wittgenstein's' argument nor `Kripke's': rather Wittgen-
stein's argument as it struck Kripke, as it presented a prob-
lem for him. (5)
Recall that the problem arose when the master considered the series
(1000, 1004, 1008, 1012 . . . ) that the the pupil  according to what
he was taking to be the proper interpretation of the rule(+2)  had
constructed, to be the result of a mistake . Kripke interprets the
story as a skeptical paradox about meaning-constitution in general,
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and rule-following in particular. The problem for Kripke is that any
rule can be restated in a way to make any act performed conform
to it. So the student in the Wittgensteinian story has a special in-
terpretation for (+2) that means add 2 to up to 1000, then add 4
above 1000. A straightforward response is that the student's inter-
pretation is not possible, simply because our rule(+2) means add
2 for all integers, and not just up to 1000. Unfortunately, it turns
out that such response will not succeed for reasons stated later. In
201 Wittgenstein states this was our paradox: no course of action
could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can
be made out to accord with the rule. Kripke considers this paradox
as the central problem of PI . He restates the problem as follows:
I, like almost all English speakers, use the word `plus' and
the symbol `+' to denote a well-known mathematical func-
tion, addition. The function is dened for all pairs of pos-
itive integers. By means of my external symbolic repre-
sentation and my internal mental representation, I `grasp'
the rule for addition. One point is crucial to my `grasp' of
this rule. Although I myself have computed only nitely
many sums in the past, the rule determines my answer for
indenitely many new sums that I have never previously
considered. This is the whole point of the notion that in
learning to add I grasp a rule: my past intentions regard-
ing addition determine a unique answer for indenitely
many new cases in the future. (8)
Here, Kripke is spelling out the intuitive angst that we might have
after considering the Wittgensteinian story. We all know that we
applied any rule (whether mathematical or not) only to a nite
number of cases in the past. But we moreover hold an implicit
assumption  which is contained in our grasp of the meaning of
`rule'  namely, that the rule under consideration can be applied
to an innite number of cases in the future. What Kripke will do
next is challenge that intuition by constructing an ingenious thought
experiment that puts into doubt the conviction that we can ascribe
a stable meaning for a specic sign in any language20. Kripke's
thought experiment goes as follows: imagine a student who has
never performed any addition operation for numbers greater than
20Kripke's argument is equally valid for natural languages as it is for formal languages.
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57, and he was then asked `what is the value of 68 plus 57?' The
student responds by doing the arithmetic as he was taught before
and produced the answer `125.' This is true for the student not
only in the arithmetic sense, but also in the metalinguistic sense
as the student is using the term `plus' to denote a function to the
eect that `57+68' should produce `125.' Now a skeptic comes to the
student and suggests that perhaps his past usage of the term `plus'
should produce `5' instead of `125.' To justify his claim the skeptic
suggests that since the student only performed additions of numbers
less than 57, then this is a complete new application of the `plus'
function. In other words, the skeptic is doubting the legitimacy of
extending our usage of `plus' as `+' from all n  1 cases to the nth
case. So it might be the case that the student's past usage of the
terms `plus' and `+' denotes a function called quus denoted by :n
xy = x+ y if x; y < 57n
xy = 5 if otherwise
The quus function ts perfectly to the student's past usage of the
`plus' term, and there is no logical reason to reject it since it is the
rst time for the student to experiment the addition of two numbers
greater than 57. Again, the student's common sense response is to
reject the skeptic's argument by claiming that when he used the
term `plus' he meant `plus' and not `quus.' It only remains for
the student to demonstrate how his intention for a specic meaning
aected his past usage of the term, and here, as we shall now see,
the paradox immediately becomes manifest. Kripke writes:
Now if the sceptic proposes his hypothesis sincerely, he
is crazy; such a bizarre hypothesis as the proposal that I
always meant quus is absolutely wild. Wild it indubitably
is, no doubt it is false; but if it is false, there must be some
fact about my past usage that can be cited to refute it.
For although the hypothesis is wild, it does not seem to
be a priori impossible. (9)
Thus, the diculty lies in the absence of any fact concerning the
student's past usage that would favour the operation `addition' over
the operation `quaddition' (viz. the operation involving quus). But
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since quaddition is not impossible a priori, and there is no fact about
the student's past behavior that rules out quaddition, `quaddition'
remains an equally valid interpretation of `+' as `plus'. Kripke con-
siders the instruction of counting as a natural candidate for solving
the problem. Thus when asked about the value of `x + y=?', the
student can just count (using his ngers for instance) the value of
x, then the value of y, then combine both and count the total. This
is a very natural way of avoiding addition and produces the same
result. Nevertheless, it is obvious that this procedure falls under
the skeptic's re too. The skeptic responds by claiming that maybe
the student was using the term `count' to mean quount which is
a process that means `count' if one is joining two heaps that are
individually less than 57, otherwise count `5' if each heap is 57 or
more. It is clear that the skeptic can apply this strategy recursively
to any simpler terms that might be used to avoid addition or count-
ing. To take it even further, Kripke extends this paradox to natural
language, and not just to mathematical operations or logical rules.
Of course, these problems apply throughout language and
are not conned to mathematical examples, though it is
with mathematical examples that they can be most smoothly
brought out. I think that I have learned the term `table' in
such a way that it will apply to indenitely many future
items. So I can apply the term to a new situation, say
when I enter the Eiel Tower for the rst time and see a
table at the base. Can I answer a sceptic who supposes
that by `table' in the past I meant tabair, where a `tabair'
is anything that is a table not found at the base of the
Eiel Tower, or a chair found there? (19)
The central question now is: is there any way for the non-skeptic
to weigh `plus' over `quus'? At rst glance it seems that there are
many answers to this question. However, Kripke thinks that there
are only two possible candidates, mental facts and behavioral facts,
and he quickly dismisses both of them. In an attempt to solve the
problem, Kripke tries to dene the scope of the paradox:
Of course the problem can be put equivalently in terms
of the sceptical query regarding my present intent: noth-
ing in my mental history establishes whether I meant plus
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or quus. So formulated, the problem may appear to be
epistemological  how can anyone know which of these I
meant? Given, however, that everything in my mental his-
tory is compatible both with the conclusion that I meant
plus and with the conclusion that I meant quus, it is clear
that the skeptical challenge is not really an epistemological
one. (21)
Although the skeptical problem seems to be an epistemological one
(i.e. how do I know that what I meant in the past by `+' was `plus'
and not `quus'?), it is more of a constitutive one. It is not about
our inability to nd the right epistemological path to generate xed
meanings for terms; rather, there might be no potential candidates
for meaning-constitutive facts at all. The main challenge for Kripke
then is to show that there are no meaning-constitutive facts by elim-
inating all possible candidates.
According to Boghossian (1989), Kripke rejects all candidates
because they do not satisfy at least one of these two criteria: (i)
meaning is normative ; (ii) meaning is innitary . Concerning the
normativity criterion, if the student means `plus' by `+', then this
state of aairs indicates how the student ought to apply `plus,' not
how the student will apply `plus.' Concerning the innitary crite-
rion, we can think of the meaning of any term as having an innitary
character which means that it could be applied to an innite num-
ber of cases. So if the student means `plus' by `+', then there is an
innite number of true states of aairs to which he can apply `plus.'
Kripke uses these two criteria mainly to reject the dispositionalist
account of meaning which argues that individual dispositions de-
termine the factuality of meanings. A dispositionalist position fails
normativity since it simply tells us what individuals would do, and
not what they ought to do. Dispositionalism will also leave no room
for individual mistakes as it denes what we are supposed to get
from following a rule by what we actually got from following that
rule, and hence leaves no possibility for mistakes. Moreover, dis-
positionalism also fails the innitary criterion; Kripke argues that
since we are nite beings (in nite time), we can only hold a nite
sum of dispositions which fails to capture the meaning of `+'21.
21A conventionalist theory of meaning can satisfy Kripke's twofold criteria. We defend such
position in sections 6 and 8.
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4 The Brain-in-a-Vat and the A Priori
Historically, Descartes was aware of the possibility of doubting our
a priori knowledge. In Mediation I of his Meditations on First Phi-
losophy , he wrote:
And, besides, as I sometimes imagine that others deceive
themselves in the things which they think they know best,
how do I know that I am not deceived every time that I
add two and three, or count the sides of a square, or judge
of things yet simpler, if anything simpler can be imagined?
(8)
He even considered, in Meditation III , the possibility that God has
created him in a way to be deceived regarding a priori knowledge:
But when I took anything very simple and easy in the
sphere of arithmetic or geometry into consideration, e.g.
that two and three together made ve, and other things
of the sort, were not these present to my mind so clearly
as to enable me to arm that they were true? Certainly
if I judged that since such matters could be doubted, this
would not have been so for any other reason than that
it came into my mind that perhaps a God might have
endowed me with such a nature that I may have been
deceived even concerning things which seemed to me most
manifest. (13)
The core of Descartes' argument is to show the plausibility of pro-
ducing knowledge  out of a skeptical scenario  that is subjectively
indistinguishable from his knowledge of a priori propositions while
actually being false; as they are the product of deception22. In this
22Descartes attempted to refute skepticism through his notable cogito ergo sum argument.
He wrote:
Accordingly, this piece of knowledgeI am thinking, therefore I existis the
rst and most certain of all to occur to anyone who philosophizes in an orderly
way. (Principles of Philosophy, 195)
And,
So that after having reected well and carefully examined all things, we must
come to the denite conclusion that this proposition: I am, I exist, is necessarily
true each time that I pronounce it, or that I mentally conceive it. (Meditation
II, 9)
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section we are interested in a dierent skeptical scenario regarding a
priori knowledge. The goal is to propose a modied version of the ex-
ternal world brain-in-a-vat (Ex-BIV) skeptical scenario to generate
a similar skeptical scenario about a priori knowledge23. Generally
speaking, we can think of two types of skepticism regarding the a
priori. The rst can be taken to be an empiricist commitment to
knowledge (viz. that all knowledge is a posteriori )24. The propo-
nents of this kind of skepticism regards `self-evident' propositions
as knowledge, but disagree with the rationalists about the warrant
of these propositions. The second type of skepticism, which we are
interested in, is more radical as it questions whether we can have a
priori knowledge in the rst place. The a priori brain-in-a-vat (Ap-
BIV) is a thought experiment about a brain-in-a-vat that is being
tricked regarding a priori knowledge. The main diculty that faces
a priori skepticism  in its second sense  is related to metaphysical
modality concerns. Many philosophers can accept the plausibility
of Ex-BIV skeptical hypothesis since any proposition about the ex-
ternal world seems to be a contingent proposition. On the other
hand, the Ap-BIV skeptical scenario seems to be prima facie logi-
cally impossible since it deals with necessary propositions. Another
diculty is that Ap-BIV seems to be self-refuting as the skeptic has
to use a form of a priori justication  based on a priori knowledge
 to construct a valid Ap-BIV scenario. The last objection is best
articulated in the words of Matthias Steup:
It is generally agreed that PAPS25 are knowable. There is
skepticism about knowledge of the external world, other
minds, and the past. Skepticism about PAPS, however,
is rarely pursued. Indeed, considering that knowledge of
PAPS includes knowledge of the laws of logic, and more
specically, knowledge of an argument's validity, it is hard
to see how a skeptical argument for anything could get o
the ground without the prior assumption that knowledge
of PAPS is indeed possible. So the knowability of PAPS
is not at issue. (2005, 10-11)
23The brain-in-a-vat argument might be regarded as the modern formulation of the Carte-
sian Evil Demon. It was rst introduced in Hilary Putnam's Reason, Truth and History
(1981) in which he used semantic externalism to argue against a version of the brain-in-a-vat
hypothesis.
24See, for example, Kitcher (1992), Kornblith (2000) and Devitt (2005).
25Viz. `putatively a priori propositions'.
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Nevertheless, James Beebe (2011) provides a response to the self-
defeating objection raised by Steup:
Ordinarily, when we put forward philosophical arguments,
we want to be able to know that our premises are true and
that they support our conclusions. If the conclusion of an
argument undermines our ability to know the premises,
one of these common epistemic goals will be thwarted.
However, in the case of skeptical arguments, showing that
we lack knowledge of a certain kind is the central goal.
Thus, if it turns out that a skeptical argument shows that
we cannot even have knowledge of the premises of that
argument, that may be no objection to the argument. If
leading us by a plausible train of reasoning to a point
where it appears that we cannot have knowledge of the
premises we started with was part of the very goal of the
skeptical argument, our resulting inability to know them
is a sign the argument has succeeded not a sign that it
has failed. (599-600, emphasis added)
An extensive discussion of a priori skepticism can be found in Beebe
(2011) and Willenken (2015) upon which we are going to rely in our
exposition.
Denition 7. (Ap-BIV Skeptical Hypothesis): Let Ap be any a priori
proposition, and let the skeptical hypothesis S 0h be: `I am Ap-BIV'.
 P1: I am unable to know the denials of S
0
h.
 P2: If I am unable to know the denials of S
0
h, then I do not
know that Ap is true.
 C: Hence, I do not know that Ap is true.
The rst premise can be supported using the notion of Dretskean
sensitivity 26.
Denition 8. (Dretskean Sensitivity): If a proposition P was not
true, then subject S would not believe P 27.
26See Dretske (1971) and Nozick (1981).
27This formulation is due to Pritchard (2016).
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The Dretskean sensitivity condition can be thought of as a modal
criterion for assessing the truth of beliefs. It requires the subject to
recognize her false beliefs by appealing to the nearest possible worlds .
That means that if S believes P , and P is false, then there exists a
near possible world where S would not believe P . Put dierently,
if P is false in a world W , and there exists a near possible world
W 0 where S believes P to be false, then P is a Dretskean sensitive
propositional knowledge. For instance, assume that S lives in our
ordinary world W where water is formed of H2O. Now we can
conceive of another close possible world W 0 where everything else is
almost the same except that water is formed of H5O. InW
0, S would
easily know that her belief of water being H2O  say after consulting
a chemistry textbook  is false. Therefore, Dretskean sensitivity is
a scheme to sort out false beliefs from true ones by appealing to the
modal notion of possible worlds. Clearly, the proposition I know
that I am not Ap-BIV is not Dretskean sensitive since in the nearest
possible world W 0, I will not be able to know its falsehood because
I am already being deceived by Ap-BIV. Therefore, the skeptic can
defend P1 in the Ap-BIV skeptical hypothesis by arguing that P1
is not Dretskean sensitive, and hence cannot be falsied 28. Also,
P2 of the Ap-BIV skeptical hypothesis can be justied based on the
assumption that knowledge is closed under entailment.
Denition 9. (Closure Principle): If subject S knows P , and knows
that P entails Q, then S knows that Q.
The closure principle only demands the subject to know the logical
consequences of proposition P . For example, knowing that Adam
is a wearing a shirt is a logical consequence of knowing that Adam
is wearing a black shirt. Similarly, I know that I am not Ap-BIV
is a logical consequence of the proposition I know that 2+5=7 is
true, as knowing the latter implies knowing the former. Hence the
skeptic can endorse P2 by endorsing the closure principle. These two
justications (viz. Dretskean sensitivity and the closure principle)
can be objected on several grounds; however, an extensive discussion
28In a similar fashion to Hempel's (1945) paradox of the ravens, an objection can be raised
against P1 by undermining the notion of Dretskean sensitivity. Let us think of the following
truth-condition: if S believes P , then P is true. Prima facie, this truth-condition is very weak
as it allows almost any proposition to be true. But, this truth-condition is logically equivalent
to Dretskean sensitivity. Thus, if we do not accept this truth condition, we ought to reject
the Dretskean sensitivity criterion.
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of them is beyond the scope of this essay29. As discussed above, the
Ap-BIV scenario is presented as a paradox: two acceptable premises
and an unacceptable conclusion.
Commonly, we can think of two categories of paradoxes: con-
tradictory and non-contradictory . The former type comes with the
format of the sorites paradoxes where the conclusion takes the form
of a contradiction (e.g. showing P and not P ), and hence cannot
be accepted. The liar's paradox is an example of this. If a liar
says I am lying, it means that he is not lying. Similarly, if he
says I am not lying, it means he is lying. On the other hand, in
non-contradictory paradoxes we reach a conclusion that is not con-
tradictory, but simply `absurd' in some sense. An example would
be the conclusion of the Ap-BIV skeptical hypothesis30.
5 Apriority and Modality
5.1 Apriority
In his celebrated Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), Kant makes a
fundamental distinction between three conceptually-related opposi-
tions: the rst is the distinction between a priori and a posteriori
knowledge31, the second is the distinction between necessary and
contingent propositions, and the third is the distinction between an-
alytic and synthetic propositions32. In the introduction of the rst
edition of CPR, Kant denes a priori knowledge as being indepen-
dent of experience as opposed to a posteriori knowledge which is
borrowed solely from experience. He writes:
Experience tells us, indeed, what is, but not that it must
necessarily be so, and not otherwise. It therefore gives
us no true universality; and reason, which is so insistent
upon this kind of knowledge, is therefore more stimulated
by it than satised. Such universal modes of knowledge,
29See Pritchard (2008) for a discussion on sensitivity-based theories in contemporary episte-
mology, and see Kvanvig (2006) for a general discussion of the dierent versions of the closure
principle. Also, refer to Leite (2004) for a critical refutation of the closure principle as a
foundational concept in the skeptical argument.
30If someone subscribes to the view that Ap-BIV skeptical hypothesis is self-refuting, then
indeed it will be a contradictory paradox.
31Cf. CPR, A 2/B 2.
32Cf. CPR, A 6/B 10  A 10/B 14.
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which at the same time possess the character of inner ne-
cessity, must in themselves, independently of experience,
be clear and certain. They are therefore entitled knowl-
edge a priori ; whereas, on the other hand, that which is
borrowed solely from experience is, as we say, known only
a posteriori , or empirically. (A2)33
When claiming that a priori knowledge is a type of knowledge that
is independent of experience34, Kant is not claiming that we would
have reached this knowledge if we had no experience at all. On the
contrary, Kant takes experience to be a prerequisite for all knowledge
acquisition, including a priori knowledge. Rather, what he means is
that experience is not a constitutive part of our a priori knowledge.
He writes:
There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with
experience. For how should our faculty of knowledge be
awakened into action did not objects aecting our senses
partly of themselves produce representations partly arouse
the activity of our understanding to compare these repre-
sentations, and, by combining or separating them, work
up the raw material of the sensible impressions into that
knowledge of objects which is entitled experience? In the
order of time, therefore, we have no knowledge antecedent
to experience, and with experience all our knowledge be-
gins. But though all our knowledge begins with experi-
ence, it does not follow that it all arises out of experience.
(B1)
The two criteria for a priori knowledge, according to Kant, are:
necessity and strict universality 35. Concerning necessity, he writes:
33All translations of CPR are from Smith (1929).
34The Kantian view can also be summed up in Frege's words in The Foundations of Arith-
metic:
[When we classify a proposition as a priori,] this is not a judgment about the
conditions, psychological, physiological, and physical, which have made it pos-
sible for us to form the content of the proposition in our consciousness; nor is it
a judgment about the way in which some other man has come . . . to believe it
to be true; rather, it is a judgment about the ultimate ground upon which rests
the justication for holding it to be true. (3)
35It is worth noting that Kant distinguishes between analytic judgments a priori and syn-
thetic judgments a priori. The criterium for synthetic judgments a priori is that these function
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Experience teaches us that a thing is so and so, but not
that it cannot be otherwise. First, then, if we have a
proposition which in being thought is thought as neces-
sary , it is an a priori judgment; and if, besides, it is not
derived from any proposition except one which also has
the validity of a necessary judgment, it is an absolutely a
priori judgment. (B3)
Apparently then, experience can only inform us about contingent
propositions. However, thinking about a proposition as necessary
is a sucient condition for being a priori. In addition, Kant dis-
tinguishes between a priori judgment(s) which can be derived from
other unnecessary proposition(s), and absolutely a priori judgment(s)
which is derived only from other necessary proposition(s). The sec-
ond criterion for a priori knowledge is strict universality ,
If, then, a judgment is thought with strict universality,
that is, in such manner that no exception is allowed as
possible, it is not derived from experience, but is valid ab-
solutely a priori ... Necessity and strict universality are
thus sure criteria of a priori knowledge, and are insepara-
ble from one another. (B4)
In recent years  probably under the inuence of Saul Kripke's work
 there have been some attempts to disentangle apriority from ne-
cessity. Hence, apriority was dened in other terms36:
Denition 10. (PK1): S's belief P is justied a priori if and only if
S' s belief P is non-experientially justied37 and cannot be defeated
as conditions of the possibility of experience,
The highest principle of all synthetic judgments is therefore this: every object
stands under the necessary conditions of synthetic unity of the manifold of in-
tuition in a possible experience. Synthetic a priori judgments are thus possible
when we relate the formal conditions of a priori intuition, the synthesis of imagi-
nation and the necessary unity of this synthesis in a transcendental apperception,
to a possible empirical knowledge in general. We then assert that the conditions
of the possibility of experience in general are likewise conditions of the possibility
of the objects of experience, and that for this reason they have objective validity
in a synthetic a priori judgment. (A 158/B197)
General pure logic (cf. CPR A 50/B 74 .) constitutes an analytic theory of the form
of thought which completely abstracts from its contents, whereas transcendental logic does
not completely abstract from the objective validity of thought, but rather inquires into its
conditions, for its main task see A 154/B 193. Thus, whereas the law of non-contradiction is
the highest principle of all judgments (cf. B189), transcendental logic explains the possibility
of synthetic judgments a priori. (A 154/ B193)
36See for instance, Putnam (1983) and Kitcher (1983).
37I.e. P is justied by a source that is non-experiential.
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by experience.
Alberto Casullo (2012) objects to PK1 based on a series of argu-
ments, and proposes instead a weaker version of PK1:
Denition 11. (C1) S's belief P is justied a priori if and only if S's
belief P is non-experientially justied.
Clearly, C1 is weaker than PK1 (since PK1 implies C1, and not the
opposite). Henceforth we are going to adopt C1 as our denition of
a priori knowledge38.
5.2 Apriority and Necessity
As mentioned above, Kant distinguishes between necessity and con-
tingency. So although it is true that `I am writing my thesis right
now'; it is also true (and thus possible) that I could have been doing
something else. Nevertheless, it seems dicult to imagine that `2+2
=5' could have been true in any plausible way. The former type can
be labeled as contingent propositions while the latter can be labeled
as necessary propositions. Kant writes that experience alone can-
not tell us about necessity and strict universality: Experience tells
us, indeed, what is, but not that it must necessarily be so, and not
otherwise. It therefore gives us no true universality.39 From such
statements we can infer that Kant thinks:
 (KP1) If P is a priori true then P is a necessary proposition.
And similarly,
 (KP2) If P is a posteriori true then P is a contingent proposi-
tion40.
The sucient condition of necessity expressed in KP1 follows triv-
ially since Kant describes necessity and strict universality as the two
fundamental properties of the a priori. Nonetheless, it turns out that
both KP1 and the other direction of KP1 (viz. if P is a necessary
proposition then P is true a priori) could be falsied . Kripke (1971,
1980) took the lead in breaking the Kantian equivalence between ne-
cessity and a priority by claiming that there might be (i) contingent
38Note that we can make a leap from a priori justication to a priori knowledge by preserving
the other knowledge-conditions.
39CPR, A2.
40See Van Cleve (1999) for example.
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a priori propositions, and (ii) necessary a posteriori propositions41.
He writes in lecture 1 of Naming and Necessity :
Philosophers have talked . . . [about] various categories of
truth, which are called `a priori ,' `analytic,' `necessary'. . .
The terms are often used as if whether there are things an-
swering to these concepts is an interesting question, but
we might as well regard them all as meaning the same
thing . . . Consider what the traditional characterizations
of such terms as `a priori ' and `necessary' are. First the
notion of a prioricity is a concept of epistemology. I guess
the traditional characterization from Kant goes something
like: a priori truths are those which can be known in-
dependently of any experience . . . I will say that some
philosophers somehow change the modality in this charac-
terization from can to must . They think that if something
belongs to the realm of a priori knowledge, it couldn't pos-
sibly be known empirically. This is just a mistake. Some-
thing may belong in the realm of such statements that can
be known a priori but still may be known by particular
people on the basis of experience. (34-35)
Then he adds concerning necessity,
The second concept which is in question is that of ne-
cessity. Sometimes this is used in an epistemological way
and might then just mean a priori . . . But what I am con-
cerned with here is a notion which is not a notion of episte-
mology but of metaphysics . . . We ask whether something
might have been true, or might have been false. Well, if
something is false, it's obviously not necessarily true. If
it is true, might it have been otherwise? Is it possible
that, in this respect, the world should have been dierent
from the way it is? If the answer is `no,' then this fact
about the world is a necessary one. If the answer is `yes,'
then this fact about the world is a contingent one. This in
and of itself has nothing to do with anyone's knowledge of
anything. It's certainly a philosophical thesis, and not a
matter of obvious denitional equivalence, either that ev-
erything a priori is necessary or that everything necessary
41It goes without saying that Kripke's thesis is controversial, see (Laporte 2016).
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is a priori . . . But at any rate they are dealing with two
dierent domains, two dierent areas, the epistemological
and the metaphysical. (35-36)
As seen above, Kripke strikes harshly against confusing the episte-
mological with the metaphysical. Following this division, Kripke is
ready to present his thesis: (i) there are contingent a priori propo-
sitions, and (ii) there are necessary a posteriori propositions. We
start by investigating (ii).
5.2.1 Necessary A Posteriori Propositions
In the preface of Naming and Necessity , Kripke argues for the neces-
sity of identities using Leibniz's law of indiscernibility of identicals42:
Already when I worked on modal logic it had seemed to
me, as Wiggins has said, that the Leibnitzian principle of
the indiscernibility of identicals was as self-evident as the
law of contradiction . . . it was clear from (x)  (x = x)
and Leibnitz's law that identity is an `internal' relation:
(x)(y)(x = y  x = y) (3)
So Kripke's task now is to show that we can have a posteriori nec-
essary identities. In order to do this, he coined the notion of rigid
designator (although the concept had previously been used by some
philosophers).
 RD (Rigid Designator): A rigid designator is a term that des-
ignates the same object in all possible worlds 43.
Think of the following statement `Hesperus = Phosphorus' which is
a true identity statement. `Hesperus' is the name given, in Greek
mythology, to an evening star; while `Phosphorus' is the term given
to a morning star. During ancient Greek times, these two heavenly
bodies were thought to be dierent, but later astronomers discovered
that both terms refer to the same object, namely Venus. Clearly
the identity `Hesperus = Phosphorus' was only known to be true, a
posteriori.
42For property F and objects x and y, we have x = y! 8F (Fx$ Fy)
43There is no consensus on the nature of these possible worlds (c.f. Menzel 2016). Nev-
ertheless, here we can think of them, in the most general sense, as `plausible counterfactual
scenarios.'
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So two things are true: rst, that we do not know a pri-
ori that Hesperus is Phosphorus, and are in no position
to nd out the answer except empirically. Second, this is
so because we could have evidence qualitatively indistin-
guishable from the evidence we have and determine the
reference of the two names by the positions of two planets
in the sky, without the planets being the same. (104)
So does that mean that `Hesperus = Phosphorus' is contingently
true? Kripke's answer is `no.' The identity statement `Hesperus
= Phosphorus' is necessarily true (in the metaphysical sense) as it
is an identity of two rigid designators . To see this, note that the
rst proper name `Hesperus' designates one object in all possible
worlds (viz. Venus). By the same token, the second proper name
`Phosphorus' designates also the same object in all possible worlds
(viz. Venus). Therefore, if the identity `Hesperus = Phosphorus'
is true then it is necessarily true, since `Venus=Venus' is necessar-
ily true in all possible worlds. Now consider the following identity
statement `Hesperus = the brightest non-lunar heavenly body in the
evening sky.' This statement is true but not necessarily true. This
is because the term `the brightest non-lunar heavenly body in the
evening sky' is not a rigid designator as we can perfectly conceive
another possible world  dierent from our actual world  where
`the brightest non-lunar heavenly body in the evening sky' desig-
nates `Mars' for instance. Hence, this identity is true regarding our
actual world, but not necessarily true regarding all possible worlds.
In addition to identity statements with proper names, Kripke shows
other categories of statements to be necessary a posteriori like (i)
identities involving natural kinds44, and (ii) attributions of essential
properties to objects45.
There are many objections to Kripke's conclusions. A solid cri-
tique comes from direct reference theorists (e.g. Soames (2002)46,
and Salmon (1986)47). According to them, we are allowed to think
of directly-referring terms as terms that lack any descriptive charac-
terization of the referent. Based on this, statements like `Hesperus =






they pick out the same referent. By stripping away the descrip-
tive characterization of `Hesperus = Phosphorus' and of `Hesperus
= Hesperus', both statements turn out to be the same. But since
`Hesperus = Hesperus' can be known a priori, then `Hesperus =
Phosphorus' can also be known a priori48.
5.2.2 Contingent A Priori Propositions
Kripke presents his thoughts about this category of propositions us-
ing the `standard meter' example. He hypothesizes that `one meter'
is the length of S, where S is an arbitrary stick in Paris. To avoid
any discrepancies in length because of time, Kripke xes the length
at time t0. The question now is: `Is it a necessary truth that S is
one meter long at t0?' Kripke answers as follows:
Someone who thinks that everything one knows a priori is
necessary might think: `This is the denition of a meter.
By denition, stick S is one meter long at t0. That's a
necessary truth.' But there seems to me to be no reason so
to conclude, even for a man who uses the stated denition
of `one meter.' For he's using this denition not to give
the meaning of what he called the `meter,' but to x the
reference. (54-55)
Hence, the role of the denition here is not meaning-ascription, but
reference-xing. Moreover, the object we used for reference-xing
is just accidental . In other words, it just happened that S had the
exact length we wanted to describe at t0; but it could have happened
that another object S 0 was the correct reference-xing tool.
. . . There is a certain length which he wants to mark out.
He marks it out by an accidental property, namely that
there is a stick of that length. Someone else might mark
out the same reference by another accidental property.
48In a similar fashion to Kripke, Quine argued against direct reference theorists. Consider
the following example from Quine (1970):
 (i) All cordates are cordates.
 (ii) All cordates are renates
Assume that both statements are true. Then for a reference theorist, (i) and (ii) are identical
statements as they have the same reference. Nevertheless, there seems to be an intuitive
semantic dierence between (i) and (ii). Statement (i) expresses that all creatures with hearts
are creatures with hearts, while statement (ii) expresses that all creatures with hearts are
creatures with kidneys.
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But in any case, even though he uses this to x the ref-
erence of his standard of length, a meter, he can still say,
`if heat had been applied to this stick S at t0, then at t0
stick S would not have been one meter long.' (55)
Kripke's thought can be analyzed using rigid designators. The iden-
tity was dened as: `the length of S at t0= one meter'. The `one
meter' term is a rigid designator as it points out to the same length
in all possible worlds. On the other hand, `the length of S at t0'
is not a rigid designator as it might designate dierent lengths at
dierent worlds depending on S and t0.
But a simple answer to the question is this: Even if this
is the only standard of length that he uses, there is an in-
tuitive dierence between the phrase `one meter' and the
phrase `the length of S at t0.' The rst phrase is meant
to designate rigidly a certain length in all possible worlds,
which in the actual world happens to be the length of the
stick S at t0. On the other hand `the length of S at t0'
does not designate anything rigidly. In some counterfac-
tual situations the stick might have been longer and in
some shorter, if various stresses and strains had been ap-
plied to it. (55)
From this discussion, Kripke concludes that the statement `S is one
meter long at t0' is contingently a priori .
What then, is the epistemological status of the statement
`Stick S is one meter long at t0,' for someone who has xed
the metric system by reference to stick S ? It would seem
that he knows it a priori. For if he used stick S to x the
reference of the term `one meter,' then as a result of this
kind of `denition' . . . he knows automatically, without
further investigation, that S is one meter long. (56)
It goes without saying that the a priority of `S is one meter long
at t0' is only known to the subject who proposed this denition.
However, it seems dicult for anyone else who was not involved
in the reference-xing procedure to know a priori that `S is one
meter long at t0.' But this dierentiability in the epistemic status of
Kripke's denition is not worrying since all what he needs to show is
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that the class of contingent a priori statements is non-empty . After
Kripke, some philosophers extended the category of contingent a
priori statements to include other categories like indexicals49.
5.3 More on Rigidity
In this section we are going to investigate Kripke's notion of rigid-
ity more extensively and discuss some of its possible implications.
We are going to focus mainly on proper names, nevertheless, our
results are extendable to a large category of rigid designators. At
rst, Kripke distinguishes between two types of rigidity: rigidity de
jure, and rigidity de facto50. The former type occurs when the des-
ignated reference is identied to be a single object in all possible
worlds by virtue of the semantic rules of language. An example of
this would be the identity statements, for instance `Nixon=Nixon.'
The proper name `Nixon' will always designate the person Nixon in
all possible worlds, if this person Nixon exists. On the other hand,
the latter type indicates what rigidity actually happens to be in
some cases where the designated object x just happens to uniquely
have the property F (x) in all possible worlds. An example of a
de facto rigid designator is `the smallest prime' which just happens
to indicate a unique entity in all possible worlds, namely number
`two.' It is not by virtue of the semantic rules of language that the
`smallest prime' denotes `two' in all possible worlds, but because
mathematical facts are unique in all possible worlds51. In Nam-
ing and Necessity , Kripke intends to defend the thesis that proper
names are rigid de jure to refute descriptivism . Intuition plays an
important role in Kripke's formulation of rigidity: In these lectures,
I will argue, intuitively, that proper names are rigid designators, for
although the man (Nixon) might not have been the President, it is
not the case that he might not have been Nixon (though he might
not have been called `Nixon')52
According to Kripke, the intuitivity of rigidity can be gained
from simple statements (i.e. non-modal statements). He gives an
example to show this: assume that the meaning of `Aristotle' is `the
last great philosopher of antiquity'. Then we can have the following:
49C.f. Braun (2015) for an extensive discussion on indexicals.
50P. 21, ft. 21.
51Here Kripke assumes a realist commitment to mathematics.
5249.
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 A1. Aristotle was fond of dogs.
 A2. The last great philosopher of antiquity was fond of dogs.
These two sentences are simple ones (with no modal content). To
show the rigidity of `Aristotle' and the non-rigidity of `the last great
philosopher of antiquity' we can appeal to intuition about the truth-
value of A1 and A2 in counterfactual scenarios. The truth-value of
the A1 and A2 might converge or diverge in dierent possible worlds.
However, in all possible worlds, the proper name `Aristotle' will
always denote the same person. On the other hand, the term `the
last great philosopher of antiquity' might refer to dierent persons
(Plato, for example) as we move across possible worlds. Closely
related to rigidity is the concept of necessity of identity . Kripke
notices that there are at least three dierent senses of talking about
`necessity of identity:'
We must distinguish three distinct theses: (i) that identi-
cal objects are necessarily identical; (ii) that true identity
statements between rigid designators are necessary; (iii)
that identity statements between what we call `names' in
actual language are necessary. (4)
The rst thesis is that everything is, necessarily, identical to itself.
 K1.(x) (x = x).
The second thesis is from modal logic; it says for every x and for
every y, if x = y, then necessarily x = y.
 K2. (x)(y)[(x = y) ! (x = y)].
The third thesis is about identity statements involving proper names.
 K3. If F = N , then necessarily F = N , where F and N are
proper names53.
Building on this, we can dene rigidity and rigid names more prop-
erly as:
53There is some disagreement in the literature about whether (K3) follows from (K2) or
not; see Burgess (2013).
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Denition 12. (Rigidity) A designator D of an object o is said to be
rigid if it is the case that for any possible world w: (i) if o exists in
w, then D designates o in w; and (ii) if o does not exist in w, then
D does not designate any other object o0 in w.
Stanley (1997) provides three possible ways according to which D
fails to be a rigid designator of o.
 Rd1. If o exits in w, but o is not designated by D.
 Rd2. If o exists in w, but D designates another object o0.
 Rd3. If o does not exists in w, and D designates another object
o0.
Therefore,
Denition 13. (Name Rigidity thesis) A proper name N is rigid only
under the condition that if N designates object o, then N designates
o rigidly .
Stanley's task now is to show that the name rigidity thesis holds
indeed. In other words, he needs to demonstrate that all proper
names are rigid designators. For that purpose he uses reductio ad
absurdum by assuming that if Rd1-Rd3 are true in case of proper
names, then we have a contradiction . Hence we have to deny that
Rd1-Rd3 hold in case of proper names, and hence conclude that
proper names are rigid designators. First, Let o be the designated
object, and let D be the designator. Now assume that D designates
o and that Rd1 is true, then:
 Rd1'. 9o[o = D ^(o exists ^ o 6= D)]
Replacing D with a proper name will result in the following state-
ment there exists someone who is Plato, and he possibly exists
without being Plato which is intuitively false. The second case,
Rd2, also does not hold using a similar argument since it follows
directly from (Rd1'). Finally, assume that D designates o and that
Rd3 is true, then:
 Rd3'. 9o[o = D ^ (D exists ^ D 6= o)]
Likewise, substituting D with a proper name results in a counterin-
tuitive statement like: there exists someone who is Plato, and Plato
could possibly exist without being him. Therefore, we can conclude
that if D is a proper name, it designates one and only one object o.
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5.4 The Problem of the Rigidity Thesis
In this section, we are going to point out several problems within
the rigidity thesis. Let us take the case of proper names54 as rigid
designators. One problem is that a proper name can have more than
one bearer. Think of the name `Socrates' which points to `the master
of Plato' and to `Sócrates Brasileiro' the Brazilian football player.
When abstracted from a specic context , the proper name `Socrates'
neither picks any nor both of them at the same time. Hence, when
Alessandro says I like Socrates, it is not vivid which `Socrates'
does his proposition pick. The absence of an inclusion/exclusion
mechanism for the designated object(s) by proper name(s) results
in the multiple bearers' problem . Nevertheless, Kripke rejects this
line of reasoning, and insists that names can be individuated by the
bearer.
Some have thought that the simple fact that two people
can have the same name refutes the rigidity thesis. It is
true that in the present monograph I spoke for simplicity
as if each name had a unique bearer. I do not in fact
think, as far as the issue of rigidity is concerned, that
this is a major oversimplication. I believe that many
important theoretical issues about the semantics of names
(probably not all) would be largely unaected had our
conventions required that no two things shall be given the
same name. In particular, as I shall explain, the issue
of rigidity would be unaected. For language as we have
it, we could speak of names as having a unique referent
if we adopted a terminology, analogous to the practice of
calling homonyms distinct `words,' according to which uses
of phonetically the same sounds to name distinct objects
count as distinct names. This terminology certainly does
not agree with the most common usage, but I think it may
have a great deal to recommend it for theoretical purposes.
(7-8)
Here Kripke is suggesting an analogy between homonyms and proper
names. So if we can think of the word `bank' (viz. the side of
a river) as distinct from the word `bank' (viz. a modern nancial
54Here proper names can be considered as types and not tokens.
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institution), then we can also think of the name `Socrates' (viz. the
master of Plato) as distinct from the name `Socrates' (viz. Sócrates
Brasileiro). Hence, according to Kripke, these two names are better
thought of as completely distinct rather than being thought of as
the same word with a dierentiated semantic component. So how
can we then dierentiate their meaning? Kripke answers:
As a speaker of my idiolect, I call only one object `Aris-
totle,' though I am aware that other people, including the
man I call `Onassis' or perhaps `Aristotle Onassis,' had
the same given name . . . In practice it is usual to sup-
pose that what is meant in a particular use of a sentence
is understood from the context . (9, emphasis added)
There are two main Kripkean claims here that we want to deal with.
The rst claim is that every proper name has a distinct bearer (i.e.
is designating a distinct object) in all possible worlds. The second
claim is that the semantics of proper names can be dierentiated
by referring to a specic context. There are various problems with
these two claims, which we are going to discuss in order. Jerrold
Katz (2001) criticizes the Kripkean analogy  seen to hold  between
homonyms and proper names because it leads to some implausible
results55:
 a. Two individuals with the name `John Smith' will be mistaken
to say, on Kripke's account, some natural statements like we
have the same name or `John Smith' is my name, too.'
 b. The denite article `the' in `The Albert Einstein lived in
Princeton' will have no interpretation unless the name `Albert
Einstein' has more than one bearer.
 c. An adjective like `Junior' associated with the son's name
will be redundant.
 d. If `Monica Lewinsky' marries `Kenneth Starr,' then she will
not be able to change her name to `Monica Starr.'
All of these counterintuitive scenarios  that contradict the common
use of natural language  stem directly from applying the Kripkean
55For the full critique, refer to Katz (2001), pp.150-152.
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thesis that distinctiveness of the referents will be a sucient con-
dition for distinctiveness of the names56.
Now we will explore the second Kripkean claim concerning the
rigidity of proper names. Here he is basically claiming that when
Alice speaks about `Socrates' in a philosophy class, then we can com-
fortably suppose that Alice intends `Socrates-master of Plato' and
not `Socrates-Brazilian footballer.' The context imposes this under-
standing, and hence the proper name `Socrates' is rigid as it picks
out a unique referent in all possible worlds, namely `Socrates-master
of Plato.' Nonetheless, by pushing this contextualist approach fur-
ther, it turns out that the whole notion of rigidity is facing serious
pitfalls. To see this consider the following story: World w1 is the ac-
tual world as we know it, and hence Socrates is indeed the master of
Plato, call him Socrates1. Now, postulate another world w2 where
Socrates was the master of Plato up to a point in time t1 where he
had an unfortunate accident and lost his memory. After t1, Socrates
became hostile to philosophy. Hence in w2, we have `Socrates-master
of Plato' before t1, call him Socrates2 , and similarly we have an-
other `Socrates-not master of Plato' after t1, call him Socrates3.
Thus, if we are back to our philosophy class and Alice says: I like
Socrates then the word `Socrates' in I like Socrates takes three
possible truth-values:
 a) In w1, for all t `Socrates'=`Socrates1' and hence Alice's
proposition is true.
 b) In w2, before t1 we have `Socrates'=`Socrates2' and hence
Alice's proposition is true.
 c) In w3, after t1 we have `Socrates'=`Socrates3' and hence
Alice's proposition is false57.
To make her statement true in all possible worlds, Alice needs to
rephrase it  by adding a temporal restriction  to something like
I like Socrates at all t in w1, and before t1 in w2 . Only by doing
so, Alice makes sure that the proper name `Socrates' refers to the
person she intends: `Socrates-master of Plato,' and not to the other
568, ft. 9.
57Here Alice's intended `Socrates-master of Plato' is absent, and we assume that she will
not like someone who is hostile to philosophy.
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Socrates who is hostile to philosophy. But now we can see where the
argument is going, as we can construct a dierent possible world w4
which proceeds exactly as w3 with the exception that `Socrates3'
regained his memory at time t2 and continued to tutor Plato, call
him `Socrates4.' So now we have the following four possibilities:
 a) In w1, for all t `Socrates'= `Socrates1' and hence Alice's
proposition is true.
 b) In w2, before t1 we have `Socrates'= `Socrates2' and hence
Alice's proposition is true.
 c) In w3, after t1 we have `Socrates'= `Socrates3' and hence
Alice's proposition is false .
 d) In w4, after t2, we have `Socrates'= `Socrates4' and hence
Alice's proposition is true.
Here again, Alice's general statement I like Socrates is false be-
cause of the (c) case where possibly `Socrates= Socrates3.' To x
it, she needs to contextualize her statement: I like Socrates at all t
in w1, before t1 in w2, and after t2 in w4. Alas, we still can construct
more possible worlds with more temporal conditions ad innitum .
This means that the proper name `Socrates' in I like Socrates will
always fail to designate the intended `Socrates-master of Plato' be-
cause we need to place an innite number of restrictions (i.e. con-
texts) to match all possible worlds. Stated dierently, recall that
Kripke responds to the multiple bearer's problem by arguing that
the exact sense of the proper name can be understood from the
given context, and hence there is no room for supposing that the
same proper name can designate multiple referents. Nonetheless,
we showed that there can be an innity of contexts to be placed to
guarantee the uniqueness of the designated referent of the proper
name, and hence proper names might not be rigid at all .
5.5 Contextual Rigidity
To x the non-rigidity of proper names resulting from the possible
innity of contexts imposed, we will propose a restricted version of
rigidity, namely contextual rigidity .
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Denition 14. (Contextual Rigidity): A contextually rigid designator
Dc is a term that designates the same object o given a specied
context c in all possible worlds.
And it follows that,
Denition 15. (Contextual Name Rigidity): A proper name N is
contextually rigid only under the condition that if N designates
object o, then N designates o in a contextually rigid manner.
Also, we can redene the necessity of identity statements involv-
ing proper names,
Denition 16. (Contextual Necessity): Given a specied context c,
If F = N , then it is contextually necessary that F = N , where F
and N are contextually rigid names.
In the next part, we will investigate the eect of the notion of
contextual rigidity on Kripke's necessary a posteriori propositions,
and contingent a priori propositions.
5.5.1 Contextually Necessary A Posteriori Propositions
Recall that Kripke argues that a proper name identity statement
like `Hesperus=Phosphorus' is necessary a posteriori. Nonetheless,
by implementing the contextualist line of thought explained above,
we can argue that such statement is indeed a posteriori, but not
necessary. To do this we need to argue against the rigidity of the
proper names `Hesperus' and `Phosphorus.' Imagine the following
story: world w1 is the actual world where `Hesperus=Phosphorus'
is true. Now consider a counterfactual world w2 where `Hespe-
rus=Phosphorus' is true at all time before t1. But it just happened
that from t1, there was a political decree to limit the use of the name
`Hesperus' to the `son of Eos'; and hence the statement `Hesperus=
Phosphorus' after t1 becomes clearly false. So for `Hesperus' to be-
come a rigid designator in worlds w1 and w2, we need to specify
a context in w2 that veries our original statement. The modied
statement will be something like `Hesperus=Phosphorus at all t in
w1, and before t1 in w2,' which is contextually necessary a posteri-
ori. This contextualist method can be used systematically to create
counterfactual worlds that violate the non-restricted necessity of
proper name identities.
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5.5.2 Contextually Necessary A Priori Propositions
The natural extension of the previous train of thought is to ask: Is
a priori knowledge necessary à la Kripke? In other words, can we
argue for the necessity of a priori knowledge based on the Kripkean
notion of rigid designators? We will claim a negative answer to this
question. More specically, we will propose that a priori knowledge
is contextually necessary but not necessary. First let us consider the
following scenario regarding a priori standard arithmetic:
 In world w1 the domain of integers is dened for all t, and hence
the equation `x+5=2' has a necessary solution of `-3'.
 In world w2, before time t1, the only dened arithmetic domain
is the set of natural numbers, and hence the equation `x+5=2'
has no solution. After t1, negative integers were introduced
in the arithmetic system, and hence `-3' becomes a necessary
solution to `x+5=2'
Thus, the statement `-3 +5=2' is not necessary, but the statement
`-3+5=2 after t1' is contextually necessary. Similarly, we can argue
for the contextual necessity of a priori knowledge using Aristotelian
logic. One of the famous syllogisms in Aristotelian logic that was
considered by medievals to be valid is the Darapti :
 P1 . All As are Cs.
 P2 . All As are Bs.
 C. Some Cs are Bs.
Nevertheless, the Darapti syllogism is invalid in rst-order logic
mainly due to the absence of the existential import in rst-order
logic58. Now consider the following scenario:
 In world w1, the only used logical system is the Aristotelian
logic for all t. Hence the Darapti is valid for all t.
 In world w2, the only used logical system before t1 is the Aris-
totelian logic. However, after t1, rst-order logic replaced Aris-
totelian logic as the used system. Therefore, the Darapti is
valid before t1, but invalid after t1.
58For a discussion about this, see Priest (2006), section 10.8.
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Here also the a priori statement `The Darapti syllogism is valid' is
not necessary as the Darapti is not a rigid designator. To see this,
note that the name `Darapti' picks a valid syllogism in w1, but an
invalid one in w2 after t1. So in a sense the `Darapti' is not a rigid
designator as it does not pick out the same object in the two worlds
for all t. Still, the restricted statement `The Darapti syllogism is
valid at all t in w1, and before t1 in w2' is contextually necessary as
the Darapti is a contextual rigid designator .
6 Conventionalism, Apriority and Necessity
6.1 Revising the A Priori
In his Critique of Pure Reason , Kant often refers to three great a
priori sciences: geometry, arithmetic, and logic. For him the objec-
tive reference of our sensuous experience is constituted by certain
cognitive a priori forms  of intuition and thought  which order the
matter of intuition and thus constitute its relation to objective corre-
lates. These formal structures of experience (viz. the pure intuitions
of space and time and the categories) are exemplied in and function
as conditions of the possibility of the three aforementioned sciences.
Space, in this sense, corresponds to geometry, time corresponds to
arithmetic, and the categories correspond to logic. For Kant, geome-
try and arithmetic59 are synthetic a priori systems of propositions60,
whereas formal logic  in contradistinction to transcendental logic 
is a body of analytic propositions, which, as such, are a priori true61.
This gives us the elds of Euclidean geometry, standard arithmetic,
and Aristotelian logic62. Traditionally, and even intuitively, a priori
knowledge was taken to be non-revisable knowledge, mainly due to
its association with analyticity and necessity.
In the previous section, we argued that a priori knowledge might
not be necessary in the Kripkean sense; rather, it is contextually
necessary. Contextual necessity aims to restrict Kripkean necessity
to limited contexts; and therefore it might be the case that some
statements are necessary in some contexts, but not necessary in
others. In what follows, we are going to investigate whether the
59The dominant twentieth century view, mainly due to Frege, is that arithmetic is analytic
a priori, and not synthetic a priori as claimed by Kant (c.f. Hinckfuss (1996)).
60B15-16, CPR.
61B190 and B193, CPR.
62See Priest (2004).
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context of utterance plays a role in shaping our ideas about necessity
by looking at the most prestigious a priori science, namely logic.
In an attempt to resolve the dilemma of the revisability of logic,





First, logica docens is logic as claimed by logicians (i.e. what logi-
cians teach about logic in their textbooks). Second, logica utens is
logic as practiced, for reasoning, by people. Finally, logica ens is
logic in-itself (i.e. what is the real notion of validity, and so on).
Priest argues that it is not only possible for logica docens to be
revised, but it was de facto revised.
At any rate, one needs only a passing acquaintance with
logic texts in the history of Western logic to see that the
logica docens was quite dierent in the various periods.
The dierences between the contents of Aristotle's Analyt-
ics , Paul of Venice's Logica Magna , the Port Royale Logic,
or the Art of Thinking , Kant's Jäsche Logik , and Hilbert
and Ackermann's Principle's of Mathematical Logic would
strike even the most casual observer. It is sometimes sug-
gested that, periods of oblivion aside, the development of
logic was cumulative. That is: something once accepted,
was never rejected. Like the corresponding view in science,
this is just plain false. (213)
Here, Priest is stressing that the process of revising logica docens
was not a mere extension of logical systems over a continuum. For
example, as seen before, the Darapti  which is a valid Aristotelian
syllogism  cannot be validated within rst-order logic. Moreover,
it cannot be validated within rst-order logic without invalidating
other principals of Aristotelian logic. He writes,
But it might well be suggested that the adoption of classi-
cal logic did not revise Aristotelian logic in any interesting
sense: Aristotelian logic was perfectly correct as far as it
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went; it was just incomplete. Classical logic simply ex-
tended it to a more complete theory. Such a suggestion
would be false. It is a well-known fact, often ignored by
philosophers (though not, perhaps, historians of philoso-
phy) that Aristotelian logic is incompatible with classical
logic in just the same way that non-Euclidean geometries
are incompatible with Euclidean geometry. (2006, 164 -
165)
Therefore, our logica docens is revisable to a great extent. It is no-
table that Priest's argument is not novel by any mean as W.V. Quine
argued in his seminal paper Two Dogmas of Empiricism 63 that it
is very hard to draw the dividing line between revisable and non-
revisable theories; and hence all a priori sciences are just as revisable
as a posteriori ones. A decade later, Hilary Putnam (1962) argued
for the revisability of logic too. In 1969, Putnam suggests that clas-
sical logic (viz. First-order logic) can be replaced by quantum logic
when reasoning about the micro-scale world. Putnam even takes his
argument further by claiming the possibility of revising the law of
non-contradiction based on empirical ndings.
But we should be clear about what the centrality argu-
ment64 does not show. It does not show that a putative
law of logic, for instance the Principle of Contradiction,
could not be overthrown by direct observation. Presum-
ably I would give up the Principle of Contradiction if I
ever had a sense datum which was both red and not red,
for example. And the centrality argument sheds no light
on how we know that this could never happen. (1983, 110)
The more dicult question is whether logic qua Logica ens can be
revised. Priest thinks that this question is reducible to another
simpler question, namely: what is validity? If the notion of validity
changes, Logica ens can change.
Whether the truth of validity-claims can change will de-
pend on what, exactly, constitutes validity. Let me illus-
trate. Suppose that one held a divine command theory
63(1951, 20-43).
64The centrality argument, for Putnam, is that the laws of logic are presupposed by so
much of the activity of argument itself that it is no wonder that we cannot envisage their
being overthrown, or all of them being overthrown, by rational argument (1983, 110).
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of validity: something is valid just if God says so. Then
God being constant and immutable, what is valid could
not change. On the other hand, suppose that one were
to subscribe to the dentist endorsement view of validity:
what is valid is what 90% of dentists endorse. Clearly,
that can change (11)
He then argues that logica ens cannot be revised given the available
notions of validity: the model-theoretic and proof-theoretic notions.
A full discussion of this point, however, does not fall within the
scope of this essay.
6.2 On Conventionalism: Wittgenstein
The story of conventionalism can be traced back to Henri Poincaré
who was working within a Kantian framework, however, he was still
not completely satised with it. The source of his dissatisfaction is
that the theorems of geometry did not t in any Kantian typology of
knowledge. For example, the state of Euclidean space is not analytic
a priori, nor synthetic a priori, nor a posteriori. It is not a priori
since it is conceivable to imagine a non-Euclidean space with no
contradictions65; hence it is not a necessary truth. In addition, it is
not a posteriori too since it is not possible for the empirical world to
falsify that `space is Euclidean.' Put dierently, there are many con-
sistent `geometries' that are incompatible with each other, but still
cannot be proved or disproved using experience, so it is not an empir-
ical truth either. Poincaré solves this geometric-typological problem
by introducing the new epistemic class of conventional knowledge .
Hence a statement like `space is Euclidean' becomes just conven-
tional knowledge that does not express a necessary truth, nor an
empirical truth. He writes,
Are they [the axioms] synthetic a priori intuitions, as Kant
armed? They would then be imposed upon us with such
a force that we could not conceive of the contrary propo-
sition, nor could we build upon it a theoretical edice.
There would be no non-Euclidean geometry. ([1902] 1952,
48)
65Recall that if a proposition is a priori then it is necessary, according to Kant.
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With the rise of logical positivism, the conventionalist program was
to reduce all necessary truth(s) to linguistic conventions. A major
contribution of Wittgenstein in the debate on the nature of neces-
sity is to emphasize the role of language-games in perceiving internal
relations among objects. Alberto Coa (1991) compares the shift
made toward the constitutive role of language by Wittgenstein to
the shift toward the constitutive role of reason made by Kant66.
The later Wittgenstein shared with the logical positivists their dis-
satisfaction with the available philosophical treatments of necessary
truth, but he diverged from them on many other points67. Gener-
ally speaking, conventionalists  along with Wittgenstein  reject
the positions of Platonism, empiricism and psychologism regarding
the nature of necessary truth. Wittgenstein expresses this in his
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics (RFM).
It is as if this expressed the essence of form.I say, how-
ever: if you talk about essence, you are merely noting
a convention. But here one would like to retort: there
is no greater dierence than that between a proposition
about the depth of the essence and one about a mere
convention. But what if I reply: to the depth that we
see in the essence there corresponds the deep need for the
convention. (I:74, [1956] 1967)
But how can we, then, link the notion of the `conventional' to the
notion of the `necessary'? After all, it seems that the conventional
is contingent while the necessary is non-contingent. There are two
general responses by conventionalists to this question. Firstly, the
(assumed) necessary truths and conventional rules share a norma-
tive feature. So, the rejection of their violations is due to their
normativity. Wittgenstein writes: If 2 and 2 apples add up to only
3 apples, i.e. if there are 3 apples there after I have put down two
66Coa writes:
Wittgenstein's and Carnap's insights on the a priori belong in the same family as
Kant's. One could, in fact, mimic Kant's famous "Copernican" pronouncement
to state their point: If our a priori knowledge must conform to the constitution
of meanings, I do not see how we could know anything of them a priori; but if
meanings must conform to the a priori, I have no diculty in conceiving such a
possibility. (263)
67For an elaborate account of the history of conventionalism from Poincaré to Quine, see
Ben-Menahem (2006).
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and again two, I don't say: `So after all 2 +2 are not always 4; but
Somehow one must have gone68'.  Secondly, and more importantly,
conventional rules and necessary truths are both constitutive . For
the conventionalist, the common sense understanding that necessary
truths are descriptive (i.e. describing an external reality) is awed.
Instead, these laws of thought constitute our mode of reasoning, call
this the priority argument :
The steps which are not brought in question are logical
inferences. But the reason why they are not brought
in question is not that they `certainly correspond to the
truth'or something of the sort,no, it is just this that is
called `thinking,' `speaking,' `inferring,' `arguing.' There
is not any question at all here of some correspondence be-
tween what is said and reality; rather is logic antecedent
to any such correspondence; in the same sense, that is, as
that in which the establishment of a method of measure-
ment is antecedent to the correctness or incorrectness of a
statement of length. (RFM , I:155)
But if the laws of thought are conventional, then we face the famous
problem of arbitrariness . In other words, if the so-called necessary
laws are being postulated by convention, then they could have been
otherwise, which is counterintuitive. Alan Sidelle (2009) articulates
this objection as follows:
One of the more familiar arguments against modal Con-
ventionalism goes something like this: According to Con-
ventionalism, what is necessary, or essential, is so because
of our conventions, our ways of conceiving and/or talking
about the world. But our conventions, whatever they are,
might have been dierent. If so, the Conventionalist must
admit that what is necessary or essential might not have
been so. But, then, it is not really necessary or essential
then! So conventionalism is false. (224)
Wittgenstein was quite aware of this problem, as a possible `re-
sponse' in Philosophical Grammar (1974) might show: Grammati-
cal rules determine a meaning and are not answerable to any mean-
ing they could contradict . . . The rules of grammar are arbitrary in
68RFM, I:156.
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the same sense as the choice of a unit of measurement69. The quote
suggests the Wittgensteinian endorsement of the arbitrariness view
of conventionalism. Ben-Menahem (2006) distinguishes between two
types of arbitrariness of conventions. In one type, arbitrariness is
interpreted as unjustiability . So in that sense, a convention is ar-
bitrary if it cannot be justied by exogenous factors. In the other
type, a convention is arbitrary if we can change it without chang-
ing its meaning or nature. Now we can see that the arbitrariness
of constitutive conventions regarding a priori knowledge comes only
in the rst sense. In that way, David Lewis (1969) considers that
`driving on one side of the road' is not a convention as it can be jus-
tied70; while `driving on which side of the road71' is a convention
as it cannot be justied. Applying this to our modes of inference
expressed in logic, Wittgenstein probably thinks of it as arbitrary
à la rst type of arbitrariness but not à la second type of arbitrari-
ness. The priority argument, mentioned above, shows that the rules
of inference used in reasoning must be there in order to equip the
notion of reason itself with a meaning, and hence these rules of in-
ference are arbitrary in the rst sense. But if these rules of inference
change, our mode of reasoning will change too, and hence they are
not arbitrary in the second sense. For the conventionalist, labeling
`necessities' as `conventional' does not undermine their compelling
force in our thought by any mean. This form of conventionalism is
mainly a refutation of the meta-necessity of necessary statements
rather than a refutation of their necessity72. Ben-Menahem (2006)
comments on this point:
. . . Traditional necessary truths lose nothing when seen
as constitutive conventions rather than super-truths, for
as far as our actual life and thought is concerned, what is
constitutive of our basic activities is every bit as unassail-
able as traditional necessary truth. (266)
Despite resolving the prima facie tension between conventionalism
and necessity, there remains a more subtle paradox in the Wittgen-
steinian version of conventionalism. Recall that Wittgenstein thinks
69I: 133.
70To reduce the number of accidents, for instance.
71I.e. right side or left side.
72Sidelle (2009) criticizes this form of conventionalism (viz. that accepts the necessity of
statements but only rejects their meta-necessity).
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that the notion of necessity arises from some linguistic conventions,
and cannot be related to any deeper truth about the world. This is
obvious from his treatment of mathematics as an invention rather
than as a discovery . He writes in Lectures on the Foundations of
Mathematics ([1939] 1976): One talks of mathematical discoveries.
I shall try again and again to show that what is called a mathemati-
cal discovery had much better be called a mathematical invention73.
So what is traditionally thought of as necessary is a mere reection
of our linguistic practices as opposed to a fundamental truth: The
connexion which is not supposed to be a causal, experiential one, but
much stricter and harder, so rigid even, that the one thing somehow
already is the other, is always a connexion in grammar. (I: 128)
But, paradoxically, this conventionalist view is challenged by
Wittgenstein's rule-following paradox discussed before in section 3.
The dilemma of the rule-following paradox is that every action can
be interpreted according to a given rule; no course of action could
be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made
to accord with the rule74. Nevertheless, and paradoxically, conven-
tionalism was exactly supposed to answer why we follow this specic
rule and not another one, namely because of a specic convention.
But the rule-following paradox questions that by allowing the same
rule to be interpreted in dierent courses of action, and allowing the
same action to be interpreted by many rules. Wittgenstein attempts
to solve this by showing that . . . there is a way of grasping a rule
which is not an interpretation, but which is exhibited in what we
call `obeying the rule' and `going against it' in actual cases75. It
is not clear here if this solution is going to work since convention-
alism  although itself being unjustied  is supposed to give us a
justication of why we apply specic rules in specic ways.
Michael Dummett (1978) attempted to save the Wittgensteinian
position from inconsistency by distinguishing two types of conven-
tionalism. The rst type of conventionalism is that widely held






Just as it is a mistake to identify a priori propositions with
empirical propositions about language, so I now think that
it is a mistake to say that they are themselves linguistic
rules. For apart from the fact that they can properly said
to be true, which linguistic rules cannot, they are distin-
guished also by being necessary, whereas linguistic rules
are arbitrary. At the same time, if they are necessary,
it is only because the relevant linguistic rules are presup-
posed. Thus, it is a contingent, empirical fact that the
word earlier is used in English to mean earlier, and it
is an arbitrary, though convenient, rule of language that
words that stand for temporal relations are to be used
transitively; but given this rule, the proposition that, if A
is earlier than B and B earlier than C, A is earlier than C
becomes a necessary truth. (17)
This type is what Dummett labels modied conventionalism which
distinguishes between trivial conventionalism like using the word
`earlier' to mean earlier, and non-trivial conventionalism like the
transitivity rule. Hence there is a dierence between what a specic
community adopts as convention (e.g. modus ponens as a mode
of inference), and the consequences of this convention (e.g. the
truth-value of the application of modus ponens). Dummett sug-
gests that Wittgenstein rejects modied conventionalism in favor of
full-blown conventionalism . In the latter form of conventionalism,
each individual application of a rule is a new convention76. Thus,
the formation of convention becomes an individual choice in full-
blown conventionalism, while being a communal choice in modied
conventionalism77.
6.3 More on Conventionalism: Carnap, Quine and Lewis
Generally speaking, we can think of two ways of dening terms
within any language. The rst way is known as implicit denition 78.
The idea is that if we can x the meaning of an expression by im-
posing a set of constraints on its usage in longer expressions (e.g.
76Wittgenstein writes: It would almost be more correct to say, not that an intuition was
needed at every stage, but that a new decision was needed at every stage (PI, I: 158).
77The Dummettian solution received multiple criticisms from many philosophers like Stroud
(1965) and Diamond (1991), among others.
78See Hale and Wright (2000) for an exposition on implicit denitions.
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sentences), then these stipulated constraints will dene the truth of
those sentences based on previously understood vocabulary. Oppo-
sitely, we have the explicit denition which aims to supply a seman-
tic equivalent expression of the deniendum. Conventions can be
regarded as a series of stipulated implicit denitions that constitute
the meaning  and truth  of the dened expressions. Consequently,
the necessity of all a priori statements is a result of our linguistic
conventions, rather than representing any metaphysical truth. By
extending these ideas to logical systems, Carnap79 established his
linguistic doctrine of logical truth . For any formal system, Carnap's
project proceeds by stipulating a set of axioms and a set of rules
of inference, both of which are taken to implicitly dene the logical
constants of the formal system in consideration. These transforma-
tion rules (viz. the rules of inferences) which specify the legitimacy
of our inferences in a formal system are merely conventional80.
Denition 17. Carnap's truth-by-convention : The logical truths of a
language system LS are all and only those sentences of LS that are
true-in-LS solely in virtue of the linguistic conventions for LS81.
By changing the linguistic conventions of the language system
LS, the logical truth of sentences in LS might vary accordingly.
Carnap thinks that we can move freely between conventions, and
hence language systems. More particularly, Carnap (1937, 51) pro-
poses a principle of tolerance which states that it is not our business
to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions. This induces
an element of contingency and arbitrariness in the adopted conven-
tion as there are no general specications for any system's rules82.
Carnap (1937) writes:
In logic there are no morals . Everyone is at liberty to
build up his own logic, i.e., his own form of language, as
79See Carnap (1937, 1947, 1950, 1955).
80The epistemic problem of how we can be justied in accepting the truth logical of state-
ments (and rule of inferences) based on schematic explicit denitions is a hard problem. Gillian
Russell (2008) wrote about this:
I am inclined to think it is one of the biggest unsolved problems facing philosophy
today. If I were to construct a `Hilbert List' of unsolved problems in philosophy,
it would certainly make the top threebut perhaps this is just because I need
to solve it and I can't. (164, ft. 5)
81This formulation is due to Ebbs (2011, 194).
82For an extensive discussion of Carnap's thoughts, see Coa (1991).
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he wishes. All that is required of him is that if he wishes
to discuss it, he must state his methods clearly, and give
syntactical rules instead of philosophical arguments. (52)
Historically, Carnap's notion of truth-by-convention lost its vigor83
mainly due to Quine's objections84. The central argument against
Carnap appears in Quine's inuential article Truth by Convention :
In the adoption of the very conventions . . . whereby logic
itself is set up, however, a diculty remains to be faced.
Each of these conventions is general, announcing the truth
of every one of an innity of statements conforming to a
certain description; derivation of the truth of any specic
statement from the general convention thus requires a log-
ical inference, and this involves us in an innite regress.
(270)
The problem of the truth-by-convention program, according to Quine,
is that if logical truth is postulated by linguistic conventions, then
we need as many conventions as the number of logical truths. Never-
theless, this seems very counterintuitive as there can be an innite
number of logical truths which require an innite number of con-
ventions. The only maneuver available for the conventionalist is to
assume a general convention (i.e. a metatheoretic convention) from
which she can logically infer the other more specic conventions.
But the diculty, again, is that the rules of logical inferences them-
selves have to be based on other conventions which in turn need
other metaconventions to justify, and hence running into innite
regress . Here, Quine uses the same intuition of Lewis Carroll for
the unjustiability of deduction to argue for the unjustiability of
truth-by-convention. He writes:
The linguistic doctrine of logical truth is sometimes ex-
pressed by saying that such truths are true by linguistic
83
Boghossian (1996) wrote:
In his classic early writings on analyticity  in particular, in "Truth by Conven-
tion," "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," and "Carnap and Logical Truth"  Quine
showed that there can be no distinction between sentences that are true purely
by virtue of their meaning and those that are not. In so doing, Quine devas-
tated the philosophical programs that depend upon a notion of analyticity 
specically, the linguistic theory of necessary truth. (360)
84For instance, Quine (1936, 1951a, 1951b, 1960).
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convention. Now if this be so, certainly the conventions
are not in general explicit . . . For it is impossible in prin-
ciple, even in an ideal state, to get even the most elemen-
tary part of logic exclusively by the explicit application
of conventions stated in advance. (The diculty is the
vicious regress, familiar from Lewis Carroll which I have
elaborated elsewhere). Briey the point is that the logical
truths, being innite in number, must be given by general
conventions rather than singly; and logic is needed then
to begin with, in the meta-theory, in order to apply the
general conventions to individual cases. (Quine 1960, 357)
One way to avoid the innite regress of conventions is by relaxing the
explicit stipulation of conventions, and adopting a dierent kind of
conventionalism  conventionalism through behavioral practice, for
instance. Likewise, Quine rejects this alternative since it is opaque
how a convention can be formerly adopted without spelling out its
explicit formulation. Also, the newly formulated language will lose
its deliberateness, and hence lose some essential characteristics we
think it should possess.
When we rst agree to understand `Cambridge' as refer-
ring to Cambridge in England failing a sux to the con-
trary, and then discourse accordingly, the role of linguis-
tic convention is intelligible; but when a convention is in-
capable of being communicated until after its adoption,
its role is not so clear. In dropping the attributes of de-
liberateness and explicitness from the notion of linguistic
convention we risk depriving the latter of any explanatory
force and reducing it to an idle label. We may wonder what
one adds to the bare statement that the truths of logic and
mathematics are a priori, or to the still barer behavioristic
statement that they are rmly accepted, when he charac-
terizes them as true by convention in such a sense. (Quine
1936, 273)
Non-explicit adoption of linguistic conventions, according to Quine,
is not well motivated then. If these conventions merely appear as
mere regularities of behavior , it will be hard to justify the tight re-
lation between the truth of a logical sentence and its meaning. It
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will turn out that the formulated language is just a description of
a previously adopted behavior, and hence it will lose its supposed
truth. In order to respond to the Quinean objections we need, rst,
to dierentiate between formal language conventionalism (viz. con-
ventionalism pertaining to formal languages) and natural language
conventionalism (viz. conventionalism pertaining to natural lan-
guages). Quine's objections do not apply to the former type of con-
ventionalism as the syntax and semantics of any formal language
are simply stipulated with the aid of natural language, and there is
no need for other prior conventions as Quine suggests. In their un-
published correspondence85, Carnap seems to notice this regarding
formal languages:
The dierence between analytic and synthetic is a dier-
ence internal to two kinds of statements inside a given lan-
guage structure; it has nothing to do with the transition
from one language to another. `Analytic' means rather
much the same as true in virtue of meaning. Since in
changing the logical structure of language everything can
be changed, even the meaning assigned to the `.' sign, nat-
urally the same sentence (i.e., the same sequence of words
or symbols) can be analytic in one system and synthetic in
another, which replaces the rst at some time. Since the
truth of an analytic sentence depends on the meaning, and
is determined by the language rules and not the observed
facts, then an analytic sentence is indeed `unrevisable' in
another sense: it remains true and analytic as long as the
language rules are not changed. (431-432)
Let us think of a natural language (say English) whose syntax and
semantics are held xed for a period of time. Now the question
is: can we generate multiple formal languages from the same natu-
ral language without manipulating the latter? If changing the log-
ical structure of a formal language changes everything regarding
that language (e.g. an analytic statement in one formal language
might be a synthetic statement in another formal language), then
it appears that we have a positive answer to our question. For in-
stance we can start by generating classical logic, and then make
85Quine, W. V., and Rudolf Carnap. Dear Carnap, Dear Van: the Quine-Carnap corre-
spondence and related work. Richard Creath (ed.) CA: University of California Press, 1990.
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some amendments (i.e. impose dierent stipulations) on its syn-
tax and semantics to create three-valued logic. This can be done
using the same linguistic conventions of English without running
into innite regress. Interestingly, our argument uses the reverse
methodology of two important programs in linguistics, namely the
program of formal syntax (Chomsky 1957)86 and the program of for-
mal semantics (Montague 1974)87. We think our argument is more
`natural' as it takes natural languages to be more primitive than the
formal language of logic88. Nevertheless, Quine's objections are per-
fectly applicable to natural language conventionalism. Fortunately,
there is a possible way out of this predicament via David Lewis'
(1969) account on conventionalism. For Lewis, the whole problem
of linguistic conventions boils down to coordination problems 89. For
Lewis, conventions arise as non-explicit solutions to coordination
problems, and hence have no clear codication to be spelled out.
This move will avoid the Quinean objection against Carnap. Lewis
(1969) denes a convention as follows:
Denition 18. (Convention90): A regularity R in the behavior of
members of a population P when they are agents in a recurrent
situation S is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is
86The Chomskian program is to dene the set of all well-formed sentences of a natural
language.
87This program aims to nd an association between logical semantics and meaningful expres-
sions of natural languages. On the relation between formal languages and natural languages,
Montague (1970) writes:
There is in my opinion no important theoretical dierence between natural lan-
guages and the articial languages of logicians; indeed, I consider it possible to
comprehend the syntax and semantics of both kinds of language within a single
natural and mathematically precise theory. On this point I dier from a number
of philosophers, but agree, I believe, with Chomsky and his associates. (373)
88The relation between natural languages and logical systems has been investigated since
few decades. For instance, Van Benthem (1986, 1987) observed that natural languages have a
form of `natural logic', which is a system of universal forms of reasoning that operate on the
surface form of natural languages. Likewise, Lako (1970) argued for the deep correspondence
between logical rules of natural languages and the grammatical structures of natural languages:
. . .most of the reasoning that is done in the world is done in natural language.
And correspondingly, most uses of natural language involve reasoning of some
sort. Thus it should not be too surprising to nd that the logical structure
that is necessary for natural language to be used as a tool for reasoning should
correspond in some deep way to the grammatical structure of natural language.
(151)
89In fact, all social interactions are dominated by coordination problems; from economic
coordinations on media of exchange, to the meanings of hand gestures.
9078.
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common knowledge in P that, in almost any instance of S among
members of P ,
1. almost everyone conforms to R;
2. almost everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;
3. almost everyone has approximately the same preferences re-
garding all possible combinations of actions;
4. almost everyone prefers that any one more conform to R, on
condition that almost everyone conform to R;
5. almost everyone would prefer that any one more conform to R0,
on condition that almost everyone conform to R0,
where R0 is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of
P in S, such that almost no one in almost any instance of S among
members of P could conform to both R0 and to R.
As noticed, Lewis' conventionalism is constituted by a series of
expectations and preferences that reinforce a behavior-regularity.
Moreover, this R is arbitrary and contingent as it could be substi-
tuted by any other R00 as long as conditions (1)-(5) are satised91.
Now we have a more consistent narrative that avoids the Quinean
objections. The story goes as follows: rstly, natural languages
evolved via implicit conventions à la Lewis. Then, formal languages
developed à la Carnap from natural languages. This implies that for-
mal languages themselves are also conventional. To see this, Lewis
identies consequences of conventions as follows:
Denition 19. A consequence R depends on R only if there is a
regularity R0 that is alternative to R, and not-R is a logical conse-
quence of R092.
But since formal languages are arbitrary, it seems that we are
stuck with the problem of how to give an account of our intuition
91Although there have been multiple criticisms for Lewis' conventionalism (c.f. Binmore




of the prima facie necessity of formal languages93. Upon deeper re-
ection, it turns out that this common sense objection is hard to
motivate for multiple reasons. First, note that Carnap, in the afore-
mentioned quotation, mentions that the same symbols can acquire
dierent meanings by changing the logical structure of the object
language. Subsequently, a logical rule LR for a language inherits
its meaning(s) from its relation to other logical rules, not-LR, in
the same language. Therefore, if the meaning of not-LR changes
then the meaning of LR will change consequently. The common
sense necessity of LR, then, is just a relational necessity , nothing
more. Second, we have an empirical evidence about the, de facto,
existence of multiple formal languages (e.g. intuitionistic logic, para-
consistent logic, three-valued logic, etc.) according to which we can
reason. Moreover, these logical systems are incompatible with each
other, implying that necessary truths are incompatible with each
other. This begs the question of which logical system is the true
one? Conventionalism suggests that all of them are equally true,
and saves the whole logical enterprise.
To wrap up, we argued for a narrative about how formal lan-
guages can be rooted in natural linguistic conventions in a way
that avoids Quine's original criticisms of Carnap. In addition, the
emergence of natural languages can be formulated using Lewis' non-
explicit conventionalism.
7 Contextualism
One of the recent developments in analytic philosophy is the rising
93There is a tradition in philosophy that undermines the role of common sense in philo-
sophical argumentation. For instance, in his Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics ; Kant
writes:
To appeal to ordinary common sense . . . is one of the subtle discoveries of recent
times, whereby the dullest windbag can condently take on the most profound
thinker and hold his own with him . . . this appeal is nothing other than a call
to the judgment of the multitude; applause at which the philosopher blushes,
but at which the popular wag becomes triumphant and deant. [4: 259].
Attacks on common sense can also be found in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit,
Since the man of common sense makes his appeal to feeling, to an oracle within
his breast, he is nished and done with anyone who does not agree; he has only
to explain that he has nothing more to say to anyone who does not nd and
feel the same in himself. In other words, he tramples underfoot the roots of
humanity. (43)
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popularity of contextualism as an inuential player in many branches
of philosophy (e.g. philosophy of language, philosophy of logic, epis-
temology, metaphysics, and others). The most obvious manifesta-
tion of contextuality is in the usage of indexicals . Imagine person
A who says to person B My opinion is right and your opinion is
mistaken, and person B responds by saying the same statement to
person A. Intuitively, we are eligible to think that the two state-
ments are not compatible although, prima facie, they are expressed
with the same utterance. In this sense, the designation of indexi-
cals changes from one context to another depending on the speaker,
time, place, among other determinants. David Kaplan (1989) pro-
vided a list of such indexicals like: personal nouns (e.g. she, he,
it), demonstrative pronouns (e.g. this, that), adjectives (e.g.
present, actual), adverbs (here, later, tomorrow), and oth-
ers. In addition, contextualism can be motivated by the usage of
modal terms.
Example 1. Suppose that both Amira and Dina utter the following
statement: Ashraf might have been a philosopher94. Here Amira
means that  according to her knowledge  Ashraf was possibly a
philosopher. Dina, on the contrary  who knows that Ashraf is not
a philosopher  means that it has been possible for Ashraf to be a
philosopher.
Hence, Amira's usage of the word `might' is an epistemic one,
while Dina's usage of the word `might' is a metaphysical one. Chang-
ing the context of usage generated two dierent meanings for the
word `might.' But even if we focus only on the epistemic use of
`might,' dierent meanings can still be generated by changing the
context.
Example 2. Imagine Jack and Jim who are both looking for Topa
on campus. After some time, they both give up on nding him, and
utter the following:
 (2) Topa might be on campus.
Utterance (2) can be rephrased as:
 (2a) According to Jack's knowledge, Topa is on campus.
94Assume here that it is the case that Ashraf is not a philosopher.
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 (2b) According to Jim's knowledge, Topa is not on campus.
The modal term `might' varied from the epistemic context of Jack to
the epistemic context of Jim, thus generated (2a) and (2b). Further-
more, contextualism can also be extended to the class of gradable
adjectives95 (e.g. tall, heavy, valuable, etc). Consider the following
example from Richard (2004):
Suppose, to take an example, that Mary wins a million
dollar lottery. Didi is impressed, and remarks to a friend
`Mary's rich.' Naomi, for whom a million dollars is not
really all that much, remarks in a conversation disjoint
from Didi's, `Mary is not rich at all'. . . It seems to most
of us that Naomi is contradicting Didi. But, especially if
each remark is part of a longer conversation . . . it is very
plausible that the truth of their claims about wealth turns
on whatever standards prevail within their conversations.
This is, in any case, part and parcel of a contextualist view
of the semantics of `rich.' But then Naomi and Didi don't
disagree, in the sense that one asserts something which is
inconsistent with what the other asserts. (218)
In the same vein, the contextualist intuition can be applied to epis-
temic terms like `know' which are context-sensitive. Generally speak-
ing, Duncan Pritchard (2002) classies epistemic contextual theo-
ries (i.e. contextualist theories regrading epistemic terms) into two
forms: The rst is semantic contextualism 96 in which conversational
contexts determine epistemic contexts. The second is inferential
contextualism97 in which inferential structures are responsible for
epistemic contexts. In semantic contextualism, the word `context'
means the attributer's conversational context. So if a person Q says
S knows P  then the verb `knows' expresses dierent truth-values
according the attributer's context of utterance (viz. the context of
Q in this case). In DeRose's (1999) words:
`Contextualism' refers to the position that the truth-conditions
knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences (sen-
tences of the form S knows that P  and S doesn't know
95See Bridges (2008) for more details.
96As found in the work of David Lewis (1996), and Keith DeRose (1995).
97As found in the work of Michael Williams (1991).
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that P  and related variants of such sentences) vary in
certain ways according to the context in which they are
uttered. (1)
By changing the context of utterance of any proposition, we are
changing the epistemic standards that must be met by subject S in
order to claim knowledge of P . DeRose (1999) continues:
What so varies is the epistemic standards that S must
meet (or, in the case of a denial of knowledge, fail to meet)
in order for such a statement to be true. In some contexts,
S knows that P  requires for its truth that S have a
true belief that P and also be in a very strong epistemic
position with respect to P , while in other contexts, the
very same sentence may require for its truth, in addition
to S's having a true belief that P , only that S meet some
lower epistemic standards. Thus, the contextualist will
allow that one speaker can truthfully say S knows that
P , while another speaker, in a dierent context where
higher standards are in place, can truthfully say S doesn't
know that P , though both speakers are talking about the
same S and the same P at the same time. (1-2)
Based on this, a high school student can claim the truth of the
following S knows that the electron's charge is 0.00048. On the
other hand, a physics professor can consistently claim the false-
hood of the same statementS knows that the electron's charge is
0.0004898. This is because the epistemic standard  regarding scien-
tic rigor  of high school students is lower than those of professional
physicists. By allowing knowledge to be context-sensitive , semantic
contextualism can solve many hardcore philosophical problems like
external-world skepticism and the possibility of free will. Concern-
ing skepticism for example, the semantic contextualist will argue
that the problem mainly arises because the skeptic is xing a high
level of epistemic standards in all conversational contexts, and the
way out is to allow these standards to vary according to contexts.
For the semantic contextualist, the epistemic standards employed in
a philosophy class are higher than those employed in quotidian con-
versational contexts. Consequently, it will be a coherent position for
98The electron charge is 4:80320451 10 10 electrostatic unit (Encyclopaedia Britannica).
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a philosophy student, during classtime, to believe that he does not
know the denial(s) of the skeptical hypothesis. But once he walks
outside of class, he can form the belief  without self-contradiction
 that he knows the denial(s) of the skeptical hypothesis.
Another prominent form of contextualism is presented byWilliams
(1995) and labeled by Pritchard (2002) as inferential contextualism .
This form is distinguished from semantic contextualism by three
main features. First, it is a subject 's contextualist thesis and not
an attributer's contextualist thesis. Second, it has an anti-realist
epistemic commitment. Third, contexts are determined by their
inferential structures, and not by their conversational modes. Con-
cerning the rst dierence, Williams' crucial factor in determining
if S knows P  (or S does not know P ) is S herself, and not a third
person attributer. Concerning the second dierence, recall that se-
mantic contextualism allowed for some contexts to be described as
epistemically superior or inferior to other contexts. This move pre-
supposes a commitment to epistemological realism , which is an extra
theoretical burden according to Williams. He writes:
What is relevant will depend on both the content of the
claim in question and the context in which the claim is en-
tered. If all evidence is relevant evidence, then, abstract-
ing from such contextual details, there will be no fact of
the matter as to what sort of evidence could or should be
brought to bear on a given proposition . . . No proposition,
considered in abstraction, will have an epistemic status it
can call its own. To suppose that it must is precisely to
fall in with what I call "epistemological realism." (113)
And
The sceptic must be an epistemological realist. Only epis-
temological realism can validate his inference from results
obtained in his very special context of philosophical re-
ection to the general impossibility of worldly knowledge.
(130)
By rejecting epistemological realism, Williams can reject any hierar-
chical classication of epistemic contexts which allows him to grant
epistemic self-suciency for each context independently.
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To adopt contextualism, however, is not just to hold that
the epistemic status of a given proposition is liable to shift
with situational, disciplinary and other contextually vari-
able factors: it is to hold that, independently of all such
inuences, a proposition has no epistemic status whatso-
ever. (P.119)
Capitalizing on this, Williams can justify the inferential nature of
contextualism. The epistemic status of each proposition is decided
based on how schematic inferences are made within the relative con-
text. Therefore, for Williams, a philosophy classroom's skeptical-
context does not induce higher epistemological standards, but only
a dierent inferential structure (viz. the standards of philosophi-
cal reection in that case). Consequently, the skeptic cannot force
her epistemic standards on daily contexts since they simply do not
represent superior standards  as there are no universal standards
 that we should adopt in all contexts. For these three main dif-
ferences between semantic and inferential contextualism, Pritchard
argues for the superiority of the latter over the former. For our pur-
pose, we will make use of inferential contextualism later on to argue
against a priori skepticism.
8 Revisiting A Priori Skepticism
8.1 Hinge Propositions
The `Common Sense' defense of epistemic justication has been pro-
moted by many philosophers like Thomas Reid, G.E. Moore and
Roderick Chisholm99. Reid once wrote: Philosophy . . . has no
other root but the principles of Common Sense; it grows out of them,
and draws its nourishment from them. Severed from this root, its
honours wither, its sap is dried up, it dies and rots100. Moore in the
same vein wrote:
There is no reason why we should not, in this respect,
make our philosophical opinions agree with what we nec-
essarily believe at other times. There is no reason why I
should not condently assert that I do really know some
99For a contemporary defense of the Common Sense tradition, see Lemos (2004).
100(Inquiry and Essays, 7)
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external facts, although I cannot prove the assertion ex-
cept by simply assuming that I do. I am, in fact, as cer-
tain of this as of anything; and as reasonably certain of it.
(Philosophical Studies , 163)
And in response to skeptical claims, Moore famously reacted:
But it seems to me a sucient refutation of such views as
these, simply to point to cases in which we do know such
things. This, after all, you know, really is a nger; there
is no doubt about it: I know it, and you all know it. And
I think we may safely challenge any philosopher to bring
forward any argument in favour either of the proposition
that we do not know it, or of the proposition that it is
not true, which does not at some point rest upon some
premises which is beyond comparison, less certain, than
the proposition which it is designed to attack (Philosoph-
ical Studies , 228)
The Moorean common sense refutation of skepticism is then based
on `knowing' that some propositions (e.g. what I see is a nger) are
just beyond doubt, and that we are reasonably justied in believ-
ing so. Moore here seems to weigh empirical observations over any
other form of philosophical-skeptical argumentation since the latter
is less `certain' than the former. Despite the compelling Moorean
reasoning, Wittgenstein  in his nal philosophical work On Cer-
tainty (OC)  nds it awed. Wittgenstein notes that any evidence
produced to support a specic belief must be at least as certain as
that belief. Hence, for Wittgenstein, the belief I know that I have
two hands demands more basic grounds to justify it. But how can
we nd a grounding-belief, in normal circumstances, which is more
certain than knowing that I have two hands?
. . . The certainty is subjective, but not the knowledge. So
if I say I know that I have two hands, and that is not
supposed to express just my subjective certainty, I must
be able to satisfy myself that I am right. But I can't do
that, for my having two hands is not less certain before
I have looked at them than afterwards. But I could say:
That I have two hands is an irreversible belief. That
would express the fact that I am not ready to let anything
count as a disproof of this proposition. (OC  245)
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Consequently, the common sense argument will not work as having
two hands is as certain as any other evidence that can be produced
to support it101. One resolution, for Wittgenstein, is made by re-
moving these Moorean truisms from the domain of knowledge. So
if having two hands is no longer a proposition that can be known,
then it can be saved from rational doubt. Wittgenstein gives the
analogy of a pupil who wants to interrupt his history lesson to doubt
the existence of Earth. Wittgenstein objects this by saying: This
doubt isn't one of the doubts in our game102. So what Wittgenstein
does, to rebut skepticism, is twisting the Moorean common sense
propositions to what he labels hinges . These hinges are contingent
claims that form the foundations of any epistemic inquiry:
[ 341] That is to say, the questions that we raise and our
doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are
exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which
those turn.
[ 342] That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientic
investigations that certain things are indeed not doubted.
[ 343] But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just
can't investigate everything, and for that reason we are
forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door
to turn, the hinges must stay put . . .
[ 345] If I ask someone what colour do you see at the mo-
ment ? in order, that is, to learn what colour is there at
the moment, I cannot at the same time question whether
the person I ask understands English, whether he wants
to take me in, whether my own memory is not leaving me
in the lurch as to the names of colours, and so on. (OC)
Hinge propositions , H, are dierent from the Moorean common
sense propositions as they are not meant to be justied from the
beginning. Any possible epistemic investigation is contingent on
them, and hence they cannot be epistemically justied. If you need
to justify H, then you need to produce an evidence E that is more
certain than H itself. For Wittgenstein this seems self-contradictory





. . .When one says that such and such a proposition can't
be proved, of course that does not mean that it can't be
derived from other propositions; any proposition can be
derived from other ones. But they may be no more certain
than it is itself. (OC  1)
Consequently, any epistemic inquiry has to presuppose certain hinge
proposition(s) before proceeding. Even philosophical skepticism has
to assume an undoubtable Archimedean point before starting the
game of doubt itself. Wittgenstein explains if you tried to doubt
everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game
of doubting itself presupposes certainty103. Thus, for Wittgenstein,
it will be a mistake to claim that we are justied in knowing H;
rather we have to assume it pretheoretically .
There are multiple interpretations for the Wittgensteinian notion
of hinge propositions104. But due to our limited scope, we are only
going to focus on a particular view of hinge propositions that was
advanced by Michael Williams105. What Wittgenstein is attempting
in OC , according to Williams, is to provide a theoretical analysis
of the unrecognized presuppositions of skeptical arguments. Partic-
ularly, Williams (2005) gives a general description of these hinges:
1. They are basic certainties, judgments, propositions which do
not constitute part of our knowledge, but also cannot be doubted.
2. They are a kind of `framework judgments' that pave the path
for inquiring, asking, justifying, arguing, and so on.
3. They are characterized by heterogeneity106. For example, these
hinges include: simple cognitive judgments (e.g. I have two
hands), general world-claims (e.g. the earth existed more than
ve seconds ago), elementary mathematical claims (e.g. 12*12=144),
and so on.
4. The certainty of hinges is not due to their intrinsic credibility,
but rather due to their meaning in the language games . Hence
by doubting them we would have to suspend making judgments.
103OC  115.
104See for example, Putnam (1992) and Wright (1985, 1991, 2003). Also see Pritchard (2001)
for a critique of these interpretations.
105See Williams (2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2005).
106This can be contrasted with the classical foundational account of knowledge where the
class of basic beliefs is quite homogeneous.
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5. Since these hinges are not part of our knowledge, then they are
outside of the scope of justication. They are non-epistemic
frameworks.
Recall that Williams endorsed an inferential version of contextual-
ism. Accordingly, in each context there must be some hinge propo-
sitions (or methodological necessities in Williams' terms) upon
which we can build our modes of inferences. In that sense, a hinge
proposition cannot be evaluated from outside its context as in that
way we will be mixing the inferential structures of dierent contexts.
The skeptic takes himself to have discovered, under the
condition of philosophical reection, that knowledge of the
world is impossible. But in fact, the most he has discov-
ered is that knowledge of the world is impossible under
the conditions of philosophical reection. (Williams 1991,
130).
Hinge propositions can be thought of as tacit pretheoretical tools
that lack any evidential support from without the epistemic context
they are employed in. Consequently, it will be illegitimate for the
skeptic to doubt the existence of the outside world in quotidian con-
texts. On a daily basis, a statement like there is an outside world
is a hinge proposition for the vast majority of human activities.
Similarly, in classical logic, the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC)
can be regarded as a hinge proposition, while this is not the case in
Dialetheism107. In that vein, Williams oers a strong rebuttal for
skepticism by arguing that skepticism confuses the hinge proposi-
tions of skeptical contexts (e.g. philosophical contexts) with those
of non-skeptical contexts (e.g. quotidian contexts). Moreover, it is
important to note that Williams  contra Moore  is not claiming a
general rebuttal of skepticism, but rather emphasizing the contextual
nature of skeptical hypotheses. In his words,
I didn't say that I could claim to know that I am not a
brain in a vat. In fact, I didn't even say that I could claim
not to be a brain in a vat. All I said was that I do know
all sorts of mundane facts; and that for as long as I know
them, I know that various sceptical possibilities do not
obtain. Claiming is another matter. (352)
107A logical system where the LNC does not hold, see for example Priest and Francesco
(2013).
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Nevertheless, Pritchard (2001) points a problem in Williams' ac-
count of hinge propositions.
By focusing on the very feature of our epistemic prac-
tices that Williams highlights  that sometimes claiming
knowledge can be improper even though we have it . . . The
problem with hinge propositions is thus not that they are
sometimes unknown (in certain contexts), but that one
can never coherently claim to know them. (13)
The impossibility of claiming knowledge of hinge propositions is a
serious challenge to Williams' account of Wittgenstein108. It can
be compared to the problem of arbitrariness in the foundationalist
theory of epistemic justication109. Nevertheless, Pritchard (2011)
thinks that hinge propositions have an upper hand over traditional
foundational beliefs as the former are not arbitrary.
In short, the suggestion is that the very possibility that
one belief can count as a reason for or against another
belief presupposes that there are some beliefs which play
the role of being exempt from needing epistemic support,
and thus that it is not arbitrary that one believes hinge
propositions. (9)
Concerning our original problem of a priori skepticism, the notion
of hinge propositions might work ne with a view on the Ap-BIV
skeptical hypothesis. Alas, it seems dicult for us to conceive how
it can solve the problem of formal language skepticism in a fully-
edged manner. More specically, hinge propositions can be used
against the syntactic  but not the semantic  version of the prob-
lem of deduction in a fashion similar to Putnam's centrality argu-
ment. Nevertheless, hinge propositions will fall short of solving the
rule-following paradox and the semantic version of the problem of
deduction. In the end, the roots of the latter problems are closely as-
sociated to the problem of meaning-normativity 110. In other words,
108Pritchard (2001) attempts to solve this problem by developing a dierent interpretation
of Wittgenstein.
109But note rst that hinge propositions cannot be regarded as foundational epistemic beliefs
(i.e. non inferential self-evident beliefs) as hinge propositions might not be self-evident or
undeniable.
110The thesis about the normativity of meaning is mainly due to Kripke's interpretation of
Wittgenstein:
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if we can nd a good explanation for the apparent normativity of
meaning of formal languages, we can then solve the problem of for-
mal language skepticism111.
8.2 Contextual-Conventionalism
In this part we are going to compile conventionalism à la Carnap-
Lewis112 and inferential contextualism as two complementary theses.
We start by dening our main notations: let the set of knowing
subjects113 be S : s1; s2; : : : ; sn, and the set of known propositions
for subject si be P : p1; p2; : : : ; pm. Similarly, we can dene the set
of all possible times as T : t1; t2 : : : ; tl, and the set of all possible
worlds as W : w1; w2; : : : ; wi. Also, the set of all possible contexts is
denoted by C = c1; c2; : : : ; cv; note that C denotes only the contexts
which are epistemically relevant to the knowing subject. Finally, we
dene the set of all possible conventions by Co = co1; co2; : : : ; coy.
Now take the ordered n-tuple K(sn; pm; wi; tl; cv; coy) to denote that
subject sn knows proposition pm in world wi at time tl given a
specied context cv and a specied convention coy. 114. Given our
framework, the last two parameters  cv and coy  are the most
decisive variables in judging the epistemic status of a proposition
pm. By changing the context cv, the convention formed coy changes,
and in accordance the epistemic status of pm varies too. To see this,
contrast the utterance of the following two statements:
 K(s1; p1; w1; t1; c1; co1).
Suppose that I do mean addition by `+'. What is the relation of this supposition
to the question of how I will respond to the problem `68 + 57'? The disposi-
tionalist gives a descriptive account of this relation: if `+' means addition, then
I will answer `125'. But his is not the proper account of the relation, which is
normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I meant addition by `+', I
will answer `125', but that, if I intended to accord with my past meaning of `+',
I should answer `125'. Computation error, niteness of my capacity, and other
disturbing factors may lead me not to be disposed to respond as I should, but if
so, I have not acted in accordance with my intention. The relation of meaning
and intention to future action is normative, not descriptive. (1982, 37)
111Recently, the notion of normativity of meaning became more inuential. See for example
Crispin Wright (1984), Simon Blackburn (1984), and John McDowell (1984).
112In the sense of the position defended in section 6.
113Knowing subjects are treated in rst person, and not through third person attributions.
114Similar descriptions can be used for other epistemic notions like `justication'. In that
case, take the ordered n-tuple J(sn; pm; wi; tl; cv ; coy) to denote that subject sn is justied
to belief proposition pm in world wi at time tl given a specied context cv and a specied
convention coy .
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 :K(s1; p1; w1; t1; c2; co2).
Given w1, t1, c1 and co1, subject s1 knows p1. While given w1, t1
, c2 and co2, the same subject s1 does not know the same propo-
sition p1. In our aforesaid defense of the conventionalist view of
logical systems, we essentially argued that any constructed formal
language is grounded in conventional natural language115. We also
argued that since formal languages follow from conventional natural
language(s), formal languages are conventional too. If this defense
holds, we hopefully have a rebuttal of the problem of formal lan-
guage skepticism.
8.3 Revisiting The Problem of Formal Language Skepti-
cism
Notably in his 1950 seminal article Empiricism, Semantics, and On-
tology, Carnap distinguished between two classes of ontological ques-
tions:
. . . it is above all necessary to recognize a fundamen-
tal distinction between two kinds of questions concerning
the existence or reality of entities . . . rst, questions of
the existence of certain entities of the new kind within
the framework ; we call them internal questions ; and sec-
ond, questions concerning the existence or reality of the
system of entities as a whole , called external questions .
Internal questions and possible answers to them are for-
mulated with the help of the new forms of expressions.
The answers may be found either by purely logical meth-
ods or by empirical methods, depending upon whether the
framework is a logical or a factual one. (21-22)
Given a specic framework (e.g. a framework of propositions, a
framework of real numbers, etc.), there are two types of  com-
monly confused  questions: internal and external questions. Inter-
nal questions are those questions asked concerning the ontological
status of some entities within a framework. For instance, a number
theorist can ask: are there innite twin prime numbers? The answer
to this question is analytically determined by the framework's rules.
115An interesting question here would be: how do dierent natural languages relate to dif-
ferent formal systems in the history of logic?
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Similarly, a physicist can ask a question about the existence of the
Higgs-Boson particle. In that case, the truth-value of the claim will
be settled by the rules of the adopted framework  which is the
standard-model in this case  with the assistance of some empirical
conrmation. Dierently, external questions are those asked con-
cerning the ontological status of a framework as a whole . For exam-
ple, a philosopher of mathematics can ask whether numbers exist
at all; or an epistemologist can ask about the existence of physi-
cal objects. For Carnap, external questions cannot be answered.
They are pseudo-questions that lack any cognitive content. Carnap
thinks that all sorts of ontological debates arise by confusing these
two questions. While it is legitimate to make internal claims since
they can be assigned a truth-value from within the framework, it
is illegitimate to make external claims as they cannot be assigned
a truth-value at all. Then Carnap argues that the choice between
frameworks can only be made based on practical considerations.
The acceptance [of a new framework] cannot be judged as
being either true or false because it is not an assertion.
It can only be judged as being more or less expedient,
fruitful, conducive to the aim for which the language is in-
tended. Judgments of this kind supply the motivation for
the decision of accepting or rejecting the kind of entities.
(31-32)
He also writes: Shall we introduce such and such forms into our
language? In this case it is not a theoretical but a practical ques-
tion, a matter of decision rather than assertion116. Analogously,
contextual-conventionalism can be divided into two general cate-
gories: internal and external conventions. Internal conventions are
those existing conventions formed  whether syntactic or seman-
tic  about a specic set of rules within a specic context117. For
instance, a group of number theorists can form an epistemic conven-
tion about the plausibility of a set of axioms for natural numbers
(e.g. Peano's axioms). So the convention is formed from within the
context of number theory. On the other hand, external conventions
are those conventions about the totality of a set of rules from with-
out a specic context. An example can be the convention between
116P. 29
117These conventions are meant to be epistemological ones in our domain of discourse.
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some mathematicians to accept the system of natural numbers as a
system of representation. In that case, they are forming a conven-
tion about the whole context of natural numbers (viz. an external
convention), and not about a specic element within the context of
natural numbers (viz. an internal convention). Now let us go back
our original problem of a priori skepticism.
Recall that the problem of deduction is twofold: (i) the premise-
circularly problem, and (ii) the rule-circularity problem. In (i), we
have an innite regress of premises where each additional rule of in-
ference is dened as a new premise, and hence a conclusion is never
reached118. In (ii), Susan Haack proposed two possible denitions
for deduction: semantic and syntactic denitions. Nonetheless, she
argued that there is no coherent defense for either of these deni-
tions. Also concerning the rule-following paradox, Kripke argued
that when using ` + ' to mean `plus' we cannot cite any fact about
our past or current usage of the term `plus' that guarantees that we
mean ` + ', and not `.' We called this twofold dilemma the prob-
lem of formal language skepticism as it casts our concern over the
epistemic validity of the whole deductive enterprise. All being well,
contextual-conventionalism might oer a route out of our epistemic
angst. Interestingly enough, the core insight of the conventionalist
solution was mentioned at the beginning of the conversation between
Achilles and the tortoise,
-So you've got to the end of our race-course? said the
Tortoise. Even though it does consist of an innite series
of distances? I thought some wiseacre or other had proved
that the thing couldn't be done?
-It can be done, said Achilles. It has been done! Solvi-
tur ambulando. You see the distances were constantly
diminishing; and so (278)
Here, Achilles seems to stumble upon an easy rebuttal of the tor-
toise's theoretical reasoning: Solvitur ambulando (i.e. the problem
of nishing the race is solved by walking .). If both Achilles and the
tortoise agree that the former succeeded in ending the race-course,
then Achilles surpassed the challenge. Nevertheless, if the tortoise
118This is since Whatever Logic is good enough to tell me is worth writing down (280), as
stated by the tortoise to Achilles.
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has a good reason to be convinced that Achilles did not nish the
race, then Achilles' solvitur-ambulando-strategy will not work. To
see this, we have to think of the conversation from a contextual-
conventionalistic perspective. Given the conversational context of
Achilles and the tortoise, the disagreement stems from the absence
of any convention between Achilles and the tortoise on what exactly
it means to nish the race. On one hand, the tortoise is seeking
a theory-based solution, while Achilles accepts an action-based solu-
tion. We call this: a situation of absence of external convention . It
is not dicult to draw a close analogy between the innite-series race
paradox discussed above and the problem of formal language skepti-
cism. In the premise circularity case, the tortoise insists that every
rule of reasoning should be stated explicitly as a premise in the ar-
gument which results in an innite regress of premises. Achilles was
very suspicious about this move, and even considered that: such
obtuseness would certainly be phenomenal119. Hence, the regress
problem can be attributed to some absence of external convention
between Achilles and the tortoise about which language they should
use to communicate. Achilles is appealing to an intuitive  practical-
based  conception of logical entailment, while the tortoise is appeal-
ing to a philosophical conception of logical entailment. Accordingly
they do not only speak dierent languages, but they also have an im-
plicit disagreement about which language they should use in convers-
ing. A similar argument can be presented in Kripke's rule-following
paradox. The core problem was that any normative action can be a
subject of multiple, other, normative interpretations. In that way,
there was a disagreement between the teacher and his pupil about:
what guarantees that the student means `addition,' and not `quad-
dition,' by the `+' operation? Yet again, the quarrel can never settle
down because of the absence of any external convention about the
meaning of `addition.' The paradox will only be solved when the
pupil and the master agree on whether `addition' means ` + ,' or `'
 or any other notion.
In this sense, formal language skepticism is a genuine prior dis-
agreement about the choice of a conventional language in a speci-
ed context. This is very dierent from a more subtle disagreement
about which rules or axioms we should adopt within any specic
119See p. 27
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framework. An illustrative example will be the question of epistemic
justication. Here we also have an external disagreement about the
source(s) of our epistemic justication. A skeptic who discredits
the idea of epistemic justication will never be able to communicate
with a non-skeptic who accepts such epistemic justication. In that
case, there is no common ground to stand on. Dierently, there is
an internal disagreement among the non-skeptics of epistemic justi-
cation as they accept the notion of epistemic justication but dier
about the best conceivable method of it (viz. foundationalism, co-
herentism, innitism).
In short, the way to remove formal language skepticism is by
removing the absence of external convention(s). Whether this is a
feasible goal or not is a dierent question that we are not going to
tackle here.
8.4 Revisiting Ap-BIV
Now we turn to the second part of a priori skepticism, namely the
Ap-BIV problem. Recall that the skeptical hypothesis was: let AP
be any a priori proposition, and let the skeptical hypothesis S 0h be:
`I am Ap-BIV.'
 P1. I am unable to know the denials of S
0
h.
 P2. If I am unable to know the denials of S
0
h, then I do not
know that Ap is true.
 C. Hence, I do not know that Ap is true.
We will counterargue the aforementioned skeptical hypothesis based
on contextual-conventionalism as follows:
Claim 1. (Conventional argument ) Given AP and S 0h , then:
 P 1 . If I am unable to know the denials of S
0
h, then I do not
know that AP is true.
 P 2 . I know that AP is true.
 C. Therefore, I know the denials of S 0h.
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P 1 shall be accepted by the skeptic since it is identical to P2 in
the original skeptical argument. To save the conventional argu-
ment, we need to defend P 2 . Our defense is based on contextual-
conventionalism. If a priori knowledge is formed by virtue of con-
vention in a specic context as we argued before, then P 2 holds triv-
ially. After all, the convention about what denes a priori knowl-
edge  in this context  is established by a sole subject, namely
myself . Hence, Cholds trivially as a private convention. Interest-
ingly, our defense of P 2 overcomes Pritchard's critique of Williams'
interpretation of Wittgenstein's hinge propositions. This is because
the conventional argument  if correct  establishes my knowledge
that AP is true. Unfortunately, the conventional argument does
not overcome the problem of arbitrariness of Wittgenstein's hinge
propositions as it allows for  almost  anything to be a priori for
the convention-holder (viz. me). Moreover, other problems start to
arise if we propose a third-person formulation of the conventional
argument.
Claim 2. (Generalized conventional argument ) Let AP be any a priori
proposition, let S be any subject dierent from myself, and let S 0h
be a skeptical hypothesis of the form: I (subject S) am Ap-BIV
 P^1. If S is unable to know the denials of S
0
h, then she does not
know that AP is true.
 P^2. S knows that AP is true.
 C^. Therefore, S knows the denials of S 0h.
How can I (or any other subject) know that P^2 is true? After all, I
have no access to subject S's private conventions about AP . This is
a very similar position to the problem of private experience discussed
by Wittgenstein:
The essential thing about private experience is really not
that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that no-
body knows whether other people also have this or some-
thing else. The assumption would thus be possiblethough
unveriablethat one section of mankind had one sensa-
tion of red and another section another. (PI ,  272)
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One possible way to know about S's private conventions about AP
is through linguistic communication. S can just convey her pri-
vate conventions to me (or any other subject), and if there is an
agreement about these conventions, then we know that AP is true.
Nevertheless, if it happens that there is a disagreement about these
conventions, then P^2 will not hold and the generalized conventional
argument will fail. In that case, the Ap-BIV dilemma persists be-
cause of the absence of external convention(s) among subjects about
what constitutes a priori knowledge.
In the end, our contextual-conventional strategy to counter skep-
ticism will only succeed if the skeptical subjects managed to form a
convention  within a specic context  about what denes a priori
knowledge. Alas, this sucient condition is dicult to satisfy as
philosophers have implicitly agreed to disagree. After all, disagree-
ment is a central dening feature of the history of philosophy and is
not expected to disappear anytime soon. This persistence of philo-
sophical disagreement is better described in the words of Peter van
Inwagen:
Disagreement in philosophy is pervasive and irresoluble.
There is almost no thesis in philosophy about which philoso-
phers agree. If there is any philosophical thesis that all or
most philosophers arm, it is a negative thesis: that for-
malism is not the right philosophy of mathematics, for
example, or that knowledge is not (simply) justied, true
belief. (2004, 332)
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